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This thesis aims to contribute to the further development ofJapanese rugby.
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the influence of foreign players on the transformation of Japanese
rugby over the last three decades. Foreign players first had an impact in company league
teams and, more latterly, have also played with distinction in the Japanese national team.
Using historical materials and interview data with players, coaches and administrators, I
show how the game of rugby in Japan has developed, and consider aspects of the
relationship between migrant players and the Japanese game. I follow the actors through
the shift from the amateur to the professional period, and describe the impact on
Japanese rugby of foreign players and coaches.
In the first chapter, I describe the establishment and historical development path of
rugby in Japan. The game has incorporated aspects of Japanese styles of organisation,
playing techniques and philosophies. Until the 1980s, high school and university rugby
was the most popular form of the game, but after then, rapidly-developing company
rugby became the predominant domestic form of the game. The company game's latest
iteration, launched in 2003, is the Top League, and in it, labour relations have become
more professional. Chapter Two describes the influence of foreign players in company
teams, looking in particular at migration trends, eligibility rules and labour relations. I
found that, as well as increasing in number, foreign players and coaches as teachers are
having a deeper influence on the way that Japanese play the game.
Chapter Three narrows the focus to a case study of a representative company team,
Yamaha Motors. It follows three broad themes, of the history of the team and its moves
to a more professional style of organisation, labour relations and the team environment,
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and the degree of equality between foreign and Japanese players, in terms of salary,
social status and the expectations on them. The company teams have a high degree of
control over players' contracts, and with salary and expectations differing between
professional foreign players, the few Japanese professionals and Japanese players
employed as regular employees, the majority, interpersonal relations are still difficult.
Chapter Four analyses the case of foreign-born players in the Japanese national team.
The eligibility criteria for the Japanese national rugby team do not demand citizenship,
only three years' residence, which has caused considerable debate. This chapter found
that changes in role that have occurred since the first selection of foreign-born players in
1986, with emphasis of late on adding leadership rather than strength. Through
comparative case studies of the national team at three key points in time, 1968, 1999
and 2003, this chapter found that the distinctive Japanese playing style on show in 1968
has now largely disappeared, although moves are underway to revive it. Additionally,
players' main loyalties are often now to company teams rather than the national team,
and many simply choose not to appear for Japan.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Research Project
The experiences of my father, Yoshihiro (Demi) Sakata', and his rugby career provide
the starting point and inspiration for my analysis of the influence of foreign players in
company league teams and the national team on the transformation of Japanese rugby
over the last three decades. I have examined historical records and made use of my
father's narrative about his time as a rugby player. His life story, presented in brief
below, focuses on his involvement in two rugby cultural contexts. In particular, the
example of my father as a 'pioneer'< migrating Japanese player highlights the research
topic on rugby migrant players between Japan and New Zealand. My father's case
presents the reverse of the current player migration flow. While my father spent six
months in New Zealand in the late 1960s playing rugby as an amateur, the current trend
is for New Zealand players to migrate to Japan to take up lucrative professional
contracts with company teams.
I My father was born at Osaka, Japan on September 26, 1942. He is a lecturer in sport leadership and
coaching in the Department of Physical Education, Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences, Japan.
2 Maguire (1996:339) uses the following five typologies for sport labour migration. He classified sports
migrants as pioneers, settlers, mercenaries, nomadic cosmopolitans and returnees. Maguire's description
of the pioneer suits my father's case.
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My father attended Rakuhoku High Schoof for the three years (from 1957 to 1960) in
Kyoto, where he began playing rugby at the age of 16. His team qualified for the
National Inter-High School Tournament in 1957-1960 as the Kyoto Prefecture
representative. Between 1960-1964, my father attended Doshisha University", majoring
in economics. He belonged to the university rugby club, which won the NHK CUp5 in
1961 and the All Japan Championship in 1963. After completing his university degree,
my father was employed by Kinki Nihon (Kintetsu) Railway Company between 1963
and 1977, and played for their company club6 until 1975. During his career at Kintetsu,
the team won the All Company Championship in 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1974, and won
the All Japan Championship in 1966, 1967 and 1974. Until his retirement, my father
played a significant role in building and supporting what is called the 'golden era' of
Japanese rugby (Murakami, 1999:4).
While my father played for Doshisha University and Kintetsu Company club he was
also selected as a member of the Japanese national team (All Japan). He won 16 caps
and scored 13 tries in 16 Test matches between 1963 and 1973. In 1968, on its first tour
of New Zealand, the All Japan team beat the Junior All Black team 23 to 19. In this
match, my father, who played on the wing, scored four tries. This was a significant
3 The Rakuhoku High School RFC is the oldest rugby club at high school level, established in 1912.
4 The Doshisha University RFC is the second oldest club at university level, established in 1911. Since
then, the team won four All University Championship titles and twice won All Japan Championship titles.
5 Until 1963, there was no organised All University Championship Tournament, only regular inter-school
matches. The champion Kansai and Kanto teams, plus the top two company teams, played off the national
championship. From 1960 to 1952 there was, however, the forerunner of the national championship, the
NHK Cup, Doshisha University won this title in 1961.
6 The Kintetsu RFC is one of the most traditional company club, established in 1927. The team won
seven All Company Championship titles and three times for All Japan Championship title. Since 2003,
the team named Kintetsu Liners has belonged to the Top League competition. Their home ground is well
known as Kintetsu Hanazono Rugby Stadium.
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achievement because of the strength of the Junior All Black team and New Zealand
rugby in general. As a result, He was selected, by The Rugby Almanac ofNew Zealand,
as one of the five outstanding players? of the year. This sensational introduction to New
Zealand rugby gave him the chance to return in 1969.
While in New Zealand in 1969, my father played for the University of Canterbury's
rugby team, for the Canterbury provincial team (during the season when Canterbury
took the Ranfurly Shield from Hawke's Bay), for the New Zealand Barbarians and for
New Zealand Universities. My father showed his distinctive skills and techniques of
change of pace and side step to beat top-level players, including All Black players. This
was a significant achievement despite his lack of size and power. New Zealand media
called him 'Flying Wing SAKATA), because of his speed and agility (Murakami,
1999:32).
His initial motive for coming to play rugby in New Zealand was to challenge his rugby
skills at the top level of the world rugby - not to make money, as rugby was an amateur
sport then. My father purely wanted to play rugby in New Zealand. As there were very
few international matches, interaction between players from different countries was
minimal. And because there were no restrictions on the selection of foreign-born players,
my father was eligible for the above-mentioned teams.
My father encountered many challenging situations while playing rugby in New
7 With Wayne Cottrell (Canterbury), Sid Going (North Auckland), Walter Spanghero (French) and Joseph
Maso (French). Those eligible for the award were players who had played in New Zealand during the
1968 season, be they of touring team, of New Zealand domestic teams, or of the All Blacks. In 1968,
All-Japan and the French national team toured New Zealand, and hence the competition for selection for
the five players of the year was among all New Zealand players plus those in the two touring squads.
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Zealand in the late 1960's. These include anti-Japanese sentiments from WWII, the
difficult of being the only Japanese player in New Zealand8 and the problems obtaining
visas. The company he worked for (Kintetsu) had given him five months' leave to play
in New Zealand during the New Zealand rugby season, upon which he had to return to
work and play for the company in Japan. In his day, the company considered the game
to be amateur; my father had to work first, pursuing his rugby career only in the time
available after work commitments had been fulfilled. The company had not been
particularly supportive, and they had not given him any extra support or dispensations.
This situation is in direct contrast to the shakaijin amateur or semi-professional mode19
(see Section 2.3) today. After rugby became professional in 1996, many top Japanese
company clubs have introduced New Zealand rugby exchange programmes, sending
promising players to New Zealand to gain rugby experiences. Such player exchanges
are regarded as 'special sabbatical leave' and the companies offer their players full
support and encouragement'", By contrast, my father's circumstance was a first for
Japanese rugby, and as there was neither precedent nor official guidelines for how his
company should treat his wish to go to New Zealand, and my father had no way of
appealing the company's decision. In this way, reflecting on the difference in treatment
8 There were times at night when his stomach ached from the pressure and tension of having
imposed/immersed himself into such a different society. However, he is/was grateful to his host family's
support and kindness. While my father was 27 years of age, his hosts warmly accepted him as a member
of their family. On the rugby field in New Zealand, my father said only one word. As a winger, he needed
to tell his teammates when to give him the ball. So, he would simply shout 'yes' and then let his play do
the talking.
9 At present, most top company clubs offer special treatment to their players hired as both regular
employees and contracted (professional) players. When a professional player is injured or ill, he can also
secure his positions as an ordinary company employee. This special treatment also includes overseas tours,
summer training camps and time off during the rugby season. Some company clubs also pay bonuses
rcegged to players' performance on the field (see Section 2.3)
o For an example of how the Yamaha club encourages its players to spend time on rugby exchanges in
New Zealand, see Section 4.2.
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of Japanese players in the 1960s and today, I was encouraged to discover and analyse
the changes in labour relations and broader issues concerning changes to Japanese
rugby.
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives
The transformation of rugby from amateur to a professional sport in 1996 and the
influence of foreign players has led to significant changes in the structure of Japanese
rugby over the past few decades. The main aim of this thesis is to investigate what has
happened to Japanese game as a result of the influx of foreign players and the shift from
the amateur to the professional rugby. The issue of importing foreign players into
Japanese rugby has become an important research topic in recent years, as the number
of foreign players and their roles in the company leagues and the national team has
increased.
The relationship between Japanese rugby and its migrant players is the key theme in this
thesis. Many company clubs brought in migrant players in the 1990s, and lifted the level
of rugby and its public profile. According to Ohtomo (1998:37), the 1990s is considered
the era of 'the company game', decided on the strength and the influence of the foreign
players. Moreover, foreign players in company leagues are now selected to the Japanese
national team. According to the Japan Rugby Magazine (2002), there are currently a
total of 1,672 players in the company teams, of whom 96 (6%) are foreign- born!'.
When researching this topic I discovered many 'sociological' questions to be addressed
11 I created this statistical data, based on company team profiles in the JAPAN RUGBY MAGAZINE in the
2002-3 season.
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in this thesis. What have been the key trends in the historical development of rugby in
Japan? In particular, how have labour relations between players and their employers
changed over time? With regard to foreign players, why do they decide to play in Japan?
What are their views about rugby migration to Japan? What qualities have foreign
players brought to the Japanese game? More importantly, how are foreign players
defined and accepted within the company leagues and the national team, and what
influences have they had on the culture of Japanese rugby? In this thesis, I gathered and
interpreted interview data from players, coaches and administrators to analyse the
relationship between Japanese rugby and migrant players.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter Two provides a historical overview of
the development of Japanese rugby. The diffusion of rugby across the world has enabled
different cultures and nations to construct particular forms of identity through their
interpretation and practice of the game. The game of rugby was brought to Japan over a
century ago. Rugby in Japan, despite its English origins, has provided for the
construction of particular local masculine cultural practices. This chapter also outlines
the Japanese organisational structures and competitions, and identifies some current
issues of concern, primarily relating to the structure of the game and labour relations.
Chapter Three seeks to draw attention to the influence of foreign rugby players in the
Japanese company leagues. It can be argued that foreign players have had a key
influence on rugby in Japan for the last two decades. This chapter outlines the historical
context of foreign players in Japanese company leagues, migrant data, eligibility rules
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and labour relations regarding foreign players. The major focus in this chapter is to
examine the motivations, experiences and views, mobility patterns of foreign players
and recruitment strategy in both the amateur and professional periods; how the influx of
foreign players have gradually had an impact on Japanese rugby; and how foreign
players view and experience the Japanese game.
Chapters Four and Five include two distinct case studies based on my primary research.
Chapter Four shows how the shift of rugby from an amateur to a professional sport and
the influence of foreign players have led to significant changes in the Yamaha Rugby
Football Club (Yamaha RFC). Yamaha has responded to competitive pressures, which
have but increased with the introduction of the Top League competition in 2003, by
changing to a more professional style of club management and labour relations with
players. Yamaha has heavily relied on foreign players to raise the quality of the game
and public profile since 1994. This chapter also examines how foreign players are
accepted and defined into the Yamaha team in comparison to their Japanese teammates.
These three themes form the basis for the discussion of interviews with three players at
Yamaha RFC; Kevin Schuler, a New Zealand player with experience of the amateur and
professional eras in Japan, a representative Fijian player, and a leading Japanese player.
Chapter Five looks at the relationship between the national team and foreign players.
Over the last two decades the influx of foreign-born players in the company leagues has
also led to major effects on the performance of the Japanese national team. This chapter
discusses the national eligibility criteria and the roles and objectives of foreign-born
players in the national team in both the amateur and professional periods. The main
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focus in this chapter is on the differing performance of the Japanese national team at
three different stages; 1969's 'Ohnishi Japan', 1999's 'Hirao's Japan' and 2003's
'Mukai Japan'. Chapter Six draws together my findings and conclusions of my research.
It outlines some of the key points of the earlier chapters, and outlines some issues for
future sociological research regarding Japanese rugby.
1.4 Use oftheoretical/analytical ideas
Elias (1982) argues that without some understanding of history, the study of social
relations is empty and ambiguous. Hutchins (1998) also suggests that a historical
dimension is needed in social analyses to understand the development of social
practices and changes. These recommendations encouraged me to first undertake a
historical investigation of the nature of Japanese rugby, in terms of its organisation and
competitions, playing styles and cultural practices. Moreover, while the introduction of
commercialism, professionalism and migrant players since the 1980s have brought
significant changes to the structure of Japanese rugby, I have sought to understand how
rugby developed in relative isolation in Japan, before the inflow of foreign influences.
The work of Nauright and Chandler (1999) was very helpful. This work is an
introduction to an edited book collection of historical and contemporary analyses of
world rugby. I began reading historical accounts of the game, which tracked its move
from the playing field of the English public school. Rugby spread across the world and
became adapted in different cultural contexts with distinctive local styles. Globalisation,
professionalisation and commercialisation have also had a huge impact on the
development of rugby. These social and historical accounts gave me clues to better
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understanding the case of foreign players in the Japanese context.
In this thesis, I have drawn on the theoretical and analytical concepts of cultural flows,
global sports labour migration and dependency theory to examine the case of foreign
rugby players in the Japanese context. Literature on sports labour migration (Bale and
Maguire, 1994) has influenced the thesis research questions and themes that I am
interested in. McGovern (2002)'s economic and social analysis of foreign footballer
players in the English League from 1946-95, provided me with another form of analysis
focusing on labour markets which identifies changes in the patterns of migrant players
and recruitment networks. In Stead and Maguire's (1998) work on Nordic/Scandinavian
players in the English League Soccer, I found an assessment of the motivation and
objectives of Nordic/Scandinavian soccer players and the lack of opportunity for
indigenous professional players. This work also included interview and research
methods, patterns of soccer labour migration, and characteristics of and
experiences/views of the Nordic/Scandinavian soccer migrants.
I have made use of Obel (2001)'s analysis of New Zealand rugby as a means of
comparison and explanation of how the transformations in New Zealand rugby have
affected the flow of New Zealand players to Japan. The focus here is on the connection
between Japan and New Zealand; that is, developments in New Zealand rugby are seen
from a perspective of their impact on Japanese rugby, rather than an analysis of these
developments in themselves.
In examining the case of foreign rugby migrants in Japan, I have referred to the work of
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Nauright and Chandler (1999), Appadurai's work (1990) on ethnoscapes, the use of
dependency theory in the work by Klein (1991) on Dominican baseball and Maguire
(1996) on British ice hockey. Maguire (1999:104) believes that the migration of sports
talents as athletic labour is a major feature of the 'global political economy'. He notes
about the general context of player migration 'the sports labour process is bound up in a
complex political economy that is itself embedded in a series of cross-cultural struggles
that characterises the global sport system'.
This trend has been evident in many leagues in many sports around the world. In
Maguire's (1996) study of ice hockey in Britain, the influx of Canadian-born players
has contributed to a situation whereby Canadian players dominate the domestic leagues
and the national team. The ready availability of keen and able Canadian players has
meant that the club teams have not put nearly as much effort into developing young
British-born players. Their development can be said to be mutually dependent, as the
teams continue to rely on a supply of Canadian 'blade runners', and the young players
rely on the British teams for professional opportunities.
Maguire's (1996) analysis of the influence of Canadian ice hockey players in England
provides clear parallels to the case of foreign rugby players (especially New Zealand
players) in Japanese company clubs and the national team. The migration of rugby
players to Japan is an example of a cultural flow, and the mobility of rugby players has
increased gradually in the last 20 years. The migration of foreign players to the wealthy
northern clubs and companies in Europe (England, Italy and France) and Japan is
primarily dependent on the demand of clubs, as the more economically powerful
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leagues and teams have attracted foreign players by offering fulltime career
opportunities, higher wages and better conditions than those provided in the foreign
players' homelands. Japanese company teams in particular rely on migrant players,
especially New Zealanders, to maintain and enhance the strength of their team. New
Zealand players also depend on Japanese company clubs for many of their professional
rugby-playing opportunities. This situation is an example of mutual dependency.
Similar to the work of Maguire, Klein (1991:99) argues that there is a structural
condition at the root of the domination of Dominican baseball by the U.S. Major League
Baseball (MLB). Klein notes that the MLB has had a hegemonic impact on both the
style and organisation of Dominican domestic baseball and the mobility of players,
particularly to the U.S. This hegemony has met with resistance, as some in Dominican
baseball have attempted to maintain its amateur traditions.
This situation has parallels to the case of Japanese company rugby teams and New
Zealand players. While the MLB has come to dominate Dominican baseball through the
power of its market, New Zealand rugby has exerted an arguably hegemonic influence
over Japanese rugby due to the strength of its playing base and depth of its technical
skills. Japanese company rugby teams, through importing many New Zealand players,
have changed the style of their (and the national team's) game from the
speed-and-ball-movement-oriented style which developed before the advent of foreign
influences in the 1980s, to a more power-oriented game. This hegemonic trend has
caused resistance, in the form of those who want Japanese rugby to be 'recognisably
Japanese'. These trends, and the arguments surrounding them, are clearly illustrated in
11
the case of the Japanese national team at three points in time; 'Ohnishi Japan' in 1968,
'Hirao Japan' in 1999 and 'Mukai Japan' in 2003.
1.5 Methodological issues and Research data
In this thesis, I have used primary research, using existing networks of contacts (the
snowball method) to gain access to and interviews with participants. I also collected
statistical data on foreign players in Japanese company leagues and the national team in
the period between 1978 and 2003. Secondary sources include rugby players'
biographies, journals, newspapers, magazine and Internet articles, which provide
insights into the migrant's motivations and objectives, patterns and trends of migrant
players, views and experiences from players, coaches, administrators and rugby
commentators such as journalists.
This thesis research mainly used qualitative methods, combining fieldwork observation
and interviewing (Blaikie, 2000). In total, I carried out 11 interviews. Approximately
half were conducted with foreign players, Japanese players, coaches, and an
administrator in Japanese company clubs, and the other half with a JRFU administrator,
players and coaches, and my father in his capacity as a former player, current coach and
a sports academic. His personal narrative and oral history were productively employed
in the historical analysis of the development of Japanese rugby. Needless to say, I
benefited greatly from 'informed 'father and son' conversation'.
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These largely 'unstructured' interviews were carried out in Japan between 2002 and
2004. I finalised the methodology, timeframe, confidentiality, and interview procedures,
as well as making contact with the participants before I travelled to Japan to conduct the
interviews. The participants and I also needed to discuss the way in which contact or
communication could be maintained between Japan and New Zealand for clarification
of the research. I approached media managers in the company clubs and the JRFU with
a phone call followed by an email letter explaining who I was, what my thesis research
was about and why they were important for my research. All my participants were
happy to participate in the project. Most of the foreign players gave me feedback, and
perhaps the research involved in my thesis can be an interesting reference for them
should they encounter similar situations to those situations already encountered and
described to me by other migrant players.
Each interview involved a discussion about the subject's playing and coaching career,
and took 40-45 minutes. Discussion were audiotaped and extensively noted.
Approximately half of the interviews were conducted in the interviewees' office. One
took place in a cafe, another in a hotel restaurant, and two interviews took place in the
indoor training room of the Yamaha RFC. My interview questions were centred around
the themes of motivations/objectives, experiences/perspectives, recruitment strategy,
professional contracts, eligibility and regulations of foreign players. I started with more
basic questions, encouraging the participants to open up by introducing themselves and
their background, aspirations, current and future issues. I approached the 'unstructured'
interviews with some prepared questions to stimulate discussion, but mostly worked
from a common theme, from which I developed questions during the course of the
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interview. In particular, Becker's (1998:58) research strategy on asking 'how' rather
than 'why' questions was very useful in expanding in the scale and depth of my
investigation by encouraging the interviewees to provide more details and honest
opinions. Analysis of the taped discussions and interviews were very useful in order to
identify key themes and issues.
One of the more difficult aspects of the interviews was power relations and cultural
distinctions between researcher and participant. The content of my interviews involved
power relations between those with 'more power' and those with 'less power'.
Additionally, due to the distinction made between 'insider' and 'outsider' groups, I
expected participants to respond with different stories or critical expressions to me as
Japanese, influencing the outcome of my research. As abel (2001:x) used her gender
difference and cultural distinction as a resource in her PhD study on rugby union in
New Zealand, I began with the assumption that, like abel, I would be a 'cultural
outsider' to foreign players. This influenced my approach to my initial interviews with
foreign players. In this situation, my anxiety increased because English is not my first
language. Thus, there were some difficulties when interviewing foreign players with
respect to language and cultural etiquette.
When interviewing Japanese players and officials, I faced a different set of cultural
challenges, those grounded in the expectations and nuances of Japanese culture. Firstly,
the Japanese are brought up to believe that the older a person gets, the more maturity
and knowledge he/she acquires (Nakane, 1997:185). That is to say, acceptable
behaviours and attitudes in a certain situation are defined by the standards set by
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sanctified custom and, perhaps even more so, by those in authority in that situation. In a
society featuring a clear hierarchy based on age, the older people will generally be in
authority (De Mente, 2004: 12). As a researcher, I was expected to respect my Japanese
participants and look up to them for guidance and advice.
Secondly, Japanese culture also emphasises formal interpersonal relationships more than
the more informal and spontaneous relationships found in Western culture. In order to
maintain 'harmony' or to prevent disagreements or unpleasant interchanges, Japanese
people usually avoid freely expressing feelings and thoughts to others, especially in
public (Nakane, 1984:192). There was no doubt that my Japanese cultural upbringing
had a strong impact on this research project. This can be a dilemma, as I often felt
caught between two cultures. I found that the Western perspectives and knowledge
gained from my time as a university student in New Zealand helped me to get used to
less formal interaction. However, I discovered that the research challenges facing me
did not present as serious a problem as I had anticipated. I was in fact considered to be
an 'insider', who had come from a strong rugby family background, with deep
involvement in the field of rugby in both Japan and New Zealand, and found this to
provide a major advantage in conducting the research process.
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Chapter Two: Introduction to Japanese Rugby
2.0 Introduction
This chapter discusses the transformation of Japanese rugby, focussing on the last three
decades. It examines changes in the organisational structures and competitions,
emphasising those that have occurred since the introduction of professionalism in
Japanese rugby. In this chapter, section 2.1 will provide a brief historical overview of
the development of rugby in Japan. The main focus is on the style of organisation of
rugby in Japan, amateur competitions and local masculine cultural practice.
In section 2.2, I will examine the formal organisational context, such as the roles and
objectives of the various competitions, including the new elite company competition,
the Top League. I will also show in section 2.3 how development in the company teams,
including the change to professionalisation, has resulted in changes to the power and
labour relations between the JRFU, company clubs and players. This has become
particularly notable in the Top League era, discussed in section 2.4.
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All of the changes that have occurred at the company level have also had effects on the
Japanese national team. The rapid pace of company team development has caused a
shift in allegiance of many players and organisations, who now favour the company
league as the peak of the Japanese game. This represents a fundamental shift in
priorities from the amateur era, in which the performance of the national team was
paramount (see Section 2.1 below). These trends, the changes to power relations they
have brought about, and opinions from leading commentators regarding possible ways
to improve national team performance, are discussed in section 2.5.
2.1 Historical Background: Rugby Union in Japan
Rugby is thought to have been brought to
Japan as long ago as the 1870s, when a
rugby club (Yokohama Football Club)
was established in the foreign settlement
in Yokohama. An early UK magazine,
The Graphic, printed accounts of rugby
games in 1874. The picture from this magazine shows that the game was played mainly
by the Royal Army and Navy, together with the settlers from Britain (Kobayashi,
2000:81). It was also played by foreign settlers at the port cities of Yokohama and Kobe
from the mid-nineteenth century, but rugby was not played by a Japanese team until the
turn of the century (Light, 1999:109).
It was Ginnosuke Tanaka, a graduate from Cambridge University in England, who, with
his colleague E. B. Clark, introduced the rules of rugby to Keio University in Tokyo,
and established the Keio Rugby Football Club in 1899. The first rugby game in Japan
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was played between Keio University and the Yokohama Country and Athletic Club.
Subsequently, rugby spread throughout elite Japanese educational institutions from the
early twentieth century, with the game experiencing rapid growth during the 1920s. As
other universities and high schools introduced rugby to their curricula, a nationwide
awareness of the game gradually built up (Yamamoto, 2000:2-4).
However, it was the 'traditional universities' that drove the spread in popularity of the
game. The 'traditional universities' - Keio 12, Waseda13 and Meiji14 Universities - were
the dominant three institutions in Tokyo rugby, and often attracted crowds of over 60,
000 people to their matches at Tokyo's National Stadium. In particular, the annual match
between Waseda and Meiji, called the Someisen15, is a rivalry of similar significance to
the match in England between Oxford and Cambridge. In summary, as Light (1999:107)
explains, prior to World War Two, rugby in Japan developed solely within institutions of
education. Furthermore, it was shaped there by an implicit perception of it as a way to
promote and reinforce dominant cultural practice and social behaviours.
While rugby did not become a national sport, the game was also adopted into many high
schools where methods of coaching and instruction were similar to baseball -
unwaveringly harsh and disciplinarian, aiming to develop spiritual and physical strength
through hardship. The methods featured individual sacrifice, endurance and an
12 Keio University RFC was established in 1899. The team has won three All University Championship
titles and one All Japan Championship title. Its most notable university championship victory was in 1999,
the year of the club's 100th anniversary.
13 Waseda University RFC was established in1918. The team has won 11 All University Championship
titles and four All Japan Championship titles.
14 Meiji University RFC was established in 1922. The team has won 12 All University Championship
titles and one All Japan Championship title.
15 The Someisen was first held in 1921, and 2004 will see its 79th edition. The match is now held
annually on the fifth of December, and as of 2003, Waseda has won 42 times, Meiji 24 times, with two
draws.
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unswerving commitment to the team. The social organisation also featured strict
age-based hierarchical relations between sempai (seniors) and kiihai (juniors) 16. The
system of values that underpinned these methods is called seishin17 masculinity, and
differs significantly from the ideology of Victorian and Edwardian games in England
(Light, 1999:109-12). While Victorian rugby was a tool for the inculcation of genteel
behaviour and upper-class values in public schools in the England, rugby in Japan was
shaped by the militaristic values of dominating masculinity, and was applied at all levels
of the education system. As a result, the practice of rugby displays Japanese concepts of
manliness, including the likes of sacrifice and endurance, brought from the feudal
samurai classes.
In this way, rugby was adapted to fit local cultural norms and ideals far from its British
origins. Once introduced, the game developed in Japan in near-isolation. The rules and
outward form of the game were adopted, but British values of manliness were largely
discarded or changed. While the game was infused with a rich spiritual seam, it was not
until the 1950s that distinctive styles of play began to emerge. In pre jet-era isolation
16 It is common for Japanese university and high school rugby teams to train six days a week, for at least
two hours each session, for almost eleven months of the year. More significantly, taking advantage of the
school summer holidays, thousands of rugby players from around the country take part in summer
training camps in Sugaraida, Nagano prefecture. These lO-clay camps are one of Japanese rugby's great
rituals. In a cool climate arguably suited to rugby, each team is put through a physically and spiritually
gruelling morning and afternoon training regime plus pre-season matches with rival teams. These camps
are crucial as they form the final preparation for regional and national tournaments. Light (1999:114)
interprets rugby, as practiced in the stronger universities and high schools, to be continuing a tradition of
preserving Japanese culture and a conservative form of masculinity.
17 In Japan, seishin was promoted by the military before WWII. The United State Occupation forces tried
to eradicate it from the school curriculum, but it re-appeared in universities and high school sporting clubs,
with rugby clubs practicing a more severe form. Seishin emphasise the unity of mind, body and soul to
build courage and self-discipline (Light, 1999:115), and is considered part of 'the Japanese spirit'. The
concept of seishin is culturally central to the ideology of the samurai warrior as the code of 'bushido'.
Rugby, which allows players to use their whole bodies, was considered an ideal medium for the
development of seishin. The seishin ideology is often expressed in competition, and the climax in the
rugby context is the annual National Inter-High School Rugby Tournament, held at the Kintetsu
Hanazono stadium in Osaka.
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there were few international matches'", the focus of the game was mostly internal'", and
intense rivalries (especially among the universities) encouraged the innovation and
development of playing styles different to those imported decades before.
In particular, the game came to accentuate speed and agility, with play flowing smoothly
across the field, rather than only up and down it. In fact, the game evolved to the point
that it was no longer considered a foreign game (Kobayashi, 2000:82-5). Perhaps
because of the rarity value, All-Japan matches were considered highly prestigious, of a
status well above domestic concerns. In 1965, a JRFU committee was set up to work
towards strengthening the All-Japan team and increasing the number of fixtures, and the
fruits of its efforts was the All-Japan team that toured New Zealand in 1968 and hosted
England in 1971. Masterminded by coach Tetsunosuke Ohnishi, the team overcame
disadvantages in size and weight to be competitive with, and sometimes beat, their
highly-ranked opponents 20. This team is also considered to represent the peak of
development of the Japanese style of play. The features of this crucial period in
Japanese rugby will be further discussed in Chapter Four.
18 The Japanese national team first played in 1930, and toured Canada in 1932, beating the Canadian
team 9 to 8. However, it mainly played against university selections on this tour. Its next Test (full
international) match was not until 1959 against Canada followed by a ten-year gap before it played
against the Junior All Black in 1968 and Hong Kong in 1969.
19 This internally-focused pattern of development could also be seen in Japanese baseball, which
developed styles of play distinctive from its American homeland (Whiting, 1989)
20 The Japanese national team (Nippon daihyo) was known the time as 'All-Japan' (Zen Nippon). The
team beat the Junior All Blacks 23-19 in 1968 and lost narrowly to the full England national team 3-6 in
1971, in the process winning the hearts of the over 50,000 people crammed into Tokyo's Prince
Chichibunomiya Memorial Stadium.
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Japanese National Team
All Universities Championship (since 1963)
(16 teams from around the country play in a round-robin competition. The
two best teams in each pool go into a knockout stage of semi-finals and
final)
All Company
Championship (1946-2003)
(16 teams from Kanto, Kansai and
Kyushu play in a round-robin
competition. The two best teams in
each pool go into a knockout stage
of semi-finals and final)
-Do
Top-League (since 2003)
(Round-robin competition featuring
the top 12 company teams)
All-Japan
Championship
(since 1948)
The format of the
All-Japan Championship
between company and
university teams has
changed several times
(see Footnote 34)
Inter-High School Tournament (since 1918)
(52 qualify, one from each of the 47 prefectures, plus two each from
Hokkaido and Tokyo and three from Osaka)
Figure2.2 Institutional Contexts and Competition
The development of Japanese rugby has long been overseen by the JRFU. The JRFU
was founded in 1926 as the governing body of all Japanese rugby. The JRFU was
established to coordinate the unification of rules, scheduling of domestic and
international matches and organising of refereeing. The JRFU is the central authority for
the 47 prefectural unions", who are charged with the development of the game through
21 Geographical Zone (Affiliated Regional Unions): 1. Kanto RFU (Red) Zone (17): Hokkaido RFU,
Aomori RFU, Iwate RFU, Miyagi RFU, Akita RFU, Yamagata RFU, Fukushima RFU, Gunma RFU,
Tochigi RFU, Ibaragi RFU, Saitama RFU, Chiba RFU, Tokyo RFU, Kanagawa RFU, Yamanashi RFU,
Nagano RFU and Niigata RFU. 2. Kansai RFU (Blue) Zone (22): Toyama RFU, Ishikawa RFU, Fukui
RFU, Shizuoka RFU, Aichi RFU, Gifu RFU, Mie RFU, Shiga RFU, Kyoto RFU, Osaka RFU, Nara RFU,
Wakayama RFU, Hyogo RFU, Okayama RFU, Hiroshima RFU, Tottori RFU, Yamaguchi RFU,
Tokushima RFU, Kagawa RFU, Kochi RFU, Kochi RFU and Ehime RFU. 3. Kyushu RFU (Green) Zone
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local clubs.
Under the umbrella of the JRFU, there are the 47 prefectural unions. Each prefectural
union administers the registration of local teams (players and coaches) from the
grassroots to top level - junior, high school, university, company and club rugby -
administration and management. Prefectural unions also run the local-level
competitions within each prefecture.
The JRFU has centralised control over national competitions and issues rules to regulate
them and the national team. However, there is a third level of administration - the
regional RFUs. The three major regional unions (Kanto RFU: 17 prefectures, Kansai
RFU: 22 prefectures and Kyushu RFU: 8 prefectures) arrange the regional games and
matches within their regions (see figure 2.1) at high school, university and company
level that serve as qualifiers for the national tournaments run by the JRFD. However, in
2003, the JRFU introduced the Top League competition, which, instead of three
different regional competitions, includes the top 12 teams from throughout Japan. This
administrative complexity, and attendant battles for control and influence between the
three levels of administration, is one of the reasons for the inconsistent administration
described in Section 2.5.
In 1918, the JRFU introduced the National Inter-High School Tournament, and further
established the All-Company Championship in 1948, the All-Japan Championship in
1963 and the All-University Championship in 1964 (see figure 2.2). Through the
(8): Fukuoka RFU, Saga RFU, Nagasaki RFU, Ohita RFU, Kumamoto RFU, Miyazaki RFU, Kagoshima
RFU and Okinawa RFU.
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domestic competitions held between September and February, the JRFU has striven to
increase the popularity of the game, while ensuring that it remained strictly amateur.
However, this amateur structure was to come under great pressure from the 1980s
following the increasing commercialisation and later professionalisation of the company
game. Until then, lucrative revenues from spectator interests, gate takings, sports
newspapers and television rights, combined with adept management of the domestic
game, saw the JRFU become one of the richest Japanese sporting authorities. Despite
the increasing revenue raised from gate-fees, television rights, sponsorship and
advertising, the vast majority of which was retained by the JRFU, the JRFU have
maintained the cherished principles of amateurism.
According to recent JRFU statistics (JRFU, 2003), Japan is fourth in the world in the
number of registered players (125,508), and easily top in the number of registered clubs
(3,506)22. Yet, a cautionary note must be added. Despite the large number of affiliated
players and clubs, and the many domestic competitions, it is still fair to say that rugby is
not a major sport in Japan. This is because rugby, which was slower to turn professional
than other major sports in Japan such as baseball and soccer, has gradually lost the vital
media (especially television) exposure that had helped to enrich it23. The converse of a
virtuous circle for other major spectator professional sports", has been that rugby has
22 This is despite the number of clubs falling dramatically from its peak of 4776 in 1992 (JRFU, 2003).
23 Rugby had enjoyed significant media coverage since the 1960s. From the mid-1980s, along with the
boom in company rugby, television coverage especially expanded dramatically. However, with the sudden
surge in popularity of soccer after the launch of the J.League in 1993, media networks moved their focus
away from rugby and along with the reduction in broadcast time came a fall in TV revenues and overall
popularity.
24 Nippon Professional Baseball was formed in 1936. Baseball has remained one of the most heavily
attended sports in Japan, with professional and high school level the most popular. There are 12
professional baseball teams (six in the Central League and six in the Pacific League).
Japan's professional soccer league, the J. League, was established in 1993. At present, the J. League has
26 teams, 16 in division one (called the II) and 12 in division two (J2). From 2005, there will be 28 teams
in this league, with the II expanding to 18 teams.
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lost its position as a major spectator sport. However, the four major domestic
competitions (perhaps with the exception of the All-Japan Championship) are still
important fixtures in the Japanese sporting calendar.
The development of the National Inter-High School Tournament, established in 1918,
showed how the popularity of the game and practices were cultivated and maintained to
further shape of local ideals of seishin masculinity. Rugby at high school level is played
throughout the year, with most teams playing in several regional tournaments. However,
the national competition is the burning goal for all. From over 1,228 high schools, 52
qualify from the local prefectural championshipsf to compete in the knockout National
Inter-High School Tournament at the Kintetsu Hanazono Stadium in Osaka. Run from
the end of December until early January, the tournament is televised nationwide and
draws a large audience/".
In recent years, fighting sports have expanded in popularity among viewers, with 'Kl ' ranked the fourth
most popular spectator sport. Kl, founded in 1980 draws on martial arts such as Karate, Kickboxing, Tae
kwon do and Kung fu. Throughout the year, the world's best fighters face off in Kl qualifying events on
five continents for the honour of competing in the KI World Grand Prix, held in December in Tokyo. In
2002, there were nearly 74, 500 spectators in the arena and TV audience rating hit 28.4%. KI represents
one of the most popular media sports. In comparison with these four popular sports, rugby has maintained
the position as the fifth most popular spectator sports in Japan.
(http://www.sanspo.com/fight/dageki/k-112002/1207taisencard.html).
25 One team qualifies from each of the 47 prefectures, plus two each from Hokkaido, and Tokyo, and
three from Osaka.
26 Formerly, every game of the tournament was televised live nationwide. However, due to a loss of
sponsorship and popularity, coverage has been scaled back to a daily highlights package with only the
semi-finals and final shown live. A similar trend has afflicted the company and university championships.
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The All Company Championship/" was introduced in 1946, and ran until it was
superseded by the Top League in 2003. This competition was popularly credited with
having maintained the high standard of rugby in Japan. From the 1980s, the company
leagues grew in popularity on the back of university rugby. As the competition in the
university league intensified, more and more effort was poured into player development.
This provided a pool of talented players graduating from university and eager to
continue playing rugby for a prestigious company. At the time, the company league
enjoyed considerable television coverage, and image-conscious companies were keen to
add to their reputation by having their name associated with a successful team. This was
reinforced by Japan's bubble economy of the 1980s, a period of extreme corporate
largesse, where image was paramount and money a secondary consideration. In such an
environment, company rugby flourished (Harada and Takahashi, 2003:1117). Trends in
company rugby are examined in greater detail in Section 2.3.
The All University Championship f was introduced in 1964. This was a major
opportunity for the JRFU to attract large crowds, especially for games featuring the
heated rivalries between the three traditional universities, plus established schools
27 There are seven company leagues: East Japan Company League (8 teams), Kansai Company A League
(8 teams), West Japan Company League (8 teams), East Japan Company Challenge League (6 teams),
Kanto Company Division One A (8 teams) and Kanto Company Division One B (8 teams). The format of
the All Company Championship competition (2002): 16 teams from Kanto, Kansai and Kyushu zones,
play of winners in four pools, from which the two best teams in each pool play go to into a knockout
tournament.
28 There are six university leagues: Kanto University Taikosen A (8 teams), Kanto University League
Division One (8 teams), Kansai University League (8 teams), Tohoku Regional University League (4
teams), Tokai University League (8 teams) and Kyushu University League (8teams). The current format
of the All University Championship competition in 2003: 16 teams from Kanto, Kansai and Kyushu zones,
play the first round in the tournament. The 8 winners of the first round is divided into the 2 pools, where a
round-robin is played within the pools. The 4 best teams of the pool games proceed to the semi-finals, and
then to the final.
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Hosei29 and Doshisha". After a tentative start, spectator interest in university rugby
increased, especially after the 1980s with the rapid growth of university rugby.
This popularity of the traditional university matches expanded the base of support for
university rugby, and by the 1980s attracted many newer universities to form rugby
clubs. Rugby is one of the most popular televised university sports", and having a
strong rugby club provided invaluable promotion for less famous universities to build
their reputation and attract students. Examples of universities that increased their public
profile through rugby are Kanto Gakuin University'[ and Daito Bunka University'".
Kanto recruited players regardless of their academic ability, solely for their rugby skills.
In the mid-1980s, Daito Bunka became the first university to recruit foreign students to
help strengthen its team, before any company teams had signed foreign players. Daito,
in its efforts to succeed in the university championship, became a pioneer in Japanese
rugby.
29 Hosei University RFC was established in 1924. The team won three All University Championship
titles in 1964.
30 Doshisha University RFC is the second oldest rugby club at university level, established in 1911. Since
then, the team has won four All University Championship titles and twice won All Japan Championship
titles.
31 Tokyo-based six traditional universities baseball tournament: Keio, Tokyo, Housei, Meiji, Rikkyo and
Waseda. The ekiden event is a relay race over the classic marathon distance. The men's team consists of
five runners (leg distances of lOkm, 5km, lOkm, 5km and 12.195km). The two travelling reserves will
complete in a 5,000m track race. Since 1920, 20 universities competed in Hakone Ekiden. It has now
become a representative New Year's sports event in Japan.
32 Kanto Gakuin University RFC was established in 1961. Since 1997, the team has won five All
University Championship titles. In the 2003-2004 season, the team beat Waseda University 33-7 to claim
the 40 th University Championship.
33 Daito Bunka University RFC was established in 1963. Since 1986, the team has won three All
University Championship titles.
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Originally established in 1948, the All Japan Championship " is the tournament
between the victorious university and company teams to decide the single best team in
Japan. In the 1960s and 70s, the university teams, especially the traditional universities,
often beat their company opposition. However, since 1987 a university team has not
won the tournament. Since the company teams became totally dedicated to rugby
excellence and improvement (by means such as employing foreign players, attracting
the elite university players and lightening the office workload of its player-employees -
see Section 2.3), the gap between company teams and universities has widened into a
gulf. The playoff games have become one-sided, often highlighting the perceived
differences between the 'men' of company rugby and the 'boys' of university rugby.
Because of this, the tournament has lost much of its meaning, and the focus of elite play
is now on the Top League involving company teams only.
2.3 The Development ofCompany Rugby
As discussed in Section 2.1, Japanese rugby has long been linked with the ideals of
amateurism. However, the shape of that amateurism has been subject to change over the
years. High school and university rugby has always been strictly amateur in the Western
sense, and shakaijin (company) rugby was also considered to be an amateur sport.
However, the shakaijin model is significantly different from Western conceptions of
34 The format of All Japan Championship has changed several times. Until 1998, the champion teams
from the All-Company and All-University tournaments clashed in a one-game playoff for the All-Japan
Championship. In 1998, the best three teams from the company tournament and the best two teams from
the university tournament played a round-robin tournament. In 1999, 2000 and 2002, the top four from
both tournaments played off, though in 2001 it was the best four company teams and two university
representatives. From 2003, the tournament shifted more radically to include 22 teams.
The many changes to the format of this tournament have been held up as an example of indecisive
decision-making and leadership by the JRFU. Among others, Kevin Schuler (Howitt and Haworth,
2002:44) has criticised the lack of consistency in decision-making. See Section 2..5 for further
explanation.
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amateurism.
With full-time work commitments were expected of the players, who would then train
and play for their company's team as well. From before the 'classic era' of Japanese
rugby in the 1960s through until the late 1980s, players were 'employees for life' of
their company. They mixed work and rugby as long as they physically could, and, upon
retiring from rugby, became full time office workers. While rugby was taken very
seriously, players still had to balance work and rugby, training after finishing a day's
work in the office from nine to five.
Players accepted this lifestyle because, at the time, there was no other route to
continuing playing rugby after university. In Japan in the 1960s and 70s, dedication to
work and the company was a high ideal, and it was no different for rugby players. Time
allowed for practice and matches was limited by the need to fulfil duties in the office -
even during tournaments, when there would be two or three matches a week, the players
had to be in the office as always on days without matches. Rest was at a premium, and
the concepts of choice and mobility were foreign. Players like Yoshihiro Sakata were
dedicated to the company and remained loyal to their employer long after hanging up
their boots.
Until retirement, the lifestyle pattern of those involved in shakaijin rugby was similar to
the amateur model found in New Zealand, the main difference being that the club was
not a community club, rather one belonging to the company (Howitt and Haworth,
2002:39-40). However, there was a change in the late 1980s, where (Japanese) players
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were allowed to spend more and more of their work time on rugby, up to around half of
their time in some cases, rather than rugby training being strictly outside normal work
hours as in the 1960s.
While these players were still all 'employees for life', this was the beginning of the
move to a 'semi-pro shakaijin style' as described in Table 2.1 below. At around the same
time, foreign players began to be hired on a short-term employment contract basis.
Called gaijin suketto (foreign helpers) or oyatoi gaikokujin (employed foreigners) (see
Chapter Three), they were respected and had great influence as teachers and coaches.
However, this created a large difference in status between the Japanese and foreign
players. In general, the Japanese were paid less, and often concentrated more on serving
their company and on their long-term job security. Ultimately, they were less dedicated
to rugby than to the company. By contrast, the foreign players focussed on playing good
rugby for the moment.
One of the biggest factors contributing to the changes in the structure of shakaijin rugby
was the so-called 'bubble economy' in the latter half of the 1980s. Companies built up
their rugby teams by promoting them for strategic corporate image benefits, featuring
the rugby team (named after the company) in general corporate publicity material such
as advertisements. In highly image-conscious Japan, a company's prosperity was often
linked more to conspicuous symbols, such as success in the company championship,
than to financial measures (Harada and Takahashi, 2003:1117).
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With the increasing pressure on company teams to win came moves to import foreign
players. The foreigners were all hired on short-term contracts, and had little office work
to do (Sakata, 2002:21). However, under amateur regulations they had to be hired as
employees, what was often called 'shamateurism' outside Japan. After the introduction
of professionalism in 1996, no such work requirement was necessary (see Chapter
Three).
With a large influx of foreign players and coaches, company rugby developed rapidly
through the 1990s (see Chapter Three). Clubs, who controlled players' contracts and
status, grew in authority relative to the JRFU, and began to demand a new competition
to bring in more revenue. The result was the introduction of the Top League (see
Section 2.4), which began in 2003. However, in the new environment, expectations of
and opportunities for the various actors are quite different. Japanese players, until now
company employees, now have the chance to become contracted professionals.
However, the salaries on offer to them are still lower than those offered to their foreign
teammates, and they must sacrifice their post-rugby job security if they take up
professional contracts. This has produced a much more uncertain and complex rugby
environment where the attractiveness of a professional contract must be balanced
against long-term considerations. As Hiroshi Nagano, captain of the purely amateur
shakaijin team Mazda RFC35 points out, "life after rugby is much Ionger'v'",
35 Mazda RFC is a purely amateur shakaijin team, with all its players employed as regular employees.
During the 1990s, Mazda employed foreign suketto under a semi-professional shakaijin model, and was
in contention for the All-Company Championship. However, as the parent company's finances worsened
towards the end of the 1990s, it was forced to release its foreign and star Japanese players, and revert to a
purely amateur style. (www.chugoku-np.co.jp/sports/now/66now.html). Without significant parent
company support, the team cannot hope to hire foreign stars, and hence cannot aim for the Top League. It
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With the introduction of the Top League, the officials of top clubs began to try to exploit
their more powerful position, demanding more influence over the organisation of the
competition, traditionally always the preserve of the JRFU or regional unions RFUs.
They have also refused to release players for national team matches. The JRFU,
outwardly clinging to amateur ideals (as described in Section 2.2), does not officially
acknowledge full professionalism, instead blurring the issue by describing the Japanese
game as still shakaijin (JRFU Annual Report, 2003).
In this way, the JRFU is not exerting central control, instead allowing a free market for
contracting players to develop, leaving all matters regarding player regulation and
eligibility to the individual clubs to determine. Thus, in contrast to the New Zealand
centralised control over both national competitions and player contracting for the Super
12 competition and the All Black team by the national rugby organisation, the NZRFU,
the JRFU has not imposed a New Zealand-style centralised control over player labour
contracting. In fact, without official recognition of the top-level Japanese game as
professional, centralisation and rule-based regulation of any sort is very difficult. In the
absence of JRFU regulation, power relations have shifted towards the top clubs
(explored in more detail in Section 2.4), a situation which is only likely to continue in
the current environment.
now plays in the Kyushu regional company league.
36 www.chugoku-np.co.jp/sports/now/66now.html.
32
The key features of the different models of organisation are summarised in the table
below. Although the distinction between purely amateur and semi-professional shakaijin
rugby is not absolutely clear, it is a useful way to characterise the changes that occurred
in Japanese rugby after the late 1980s.
Amateur (NZ
etc)
Shakaijin
Purely amateur Semi-pro style
Top League Professional (Super 12,
European Premiership)
security None
employed
the club)
(not High (players High for High (for Japanese
by are likely to be Japanese players who are lifetime
lifetime players (all as employees; however,
employees of lifetime unlike shakaijin teams,
the parent employees). some may be asked to
company) Low for return to the parent
foreign players company if deemed
(on short-term below the team's
contracts). standard).
Low for foreign players
and Japanese players on
professional contracts.
Professional
players are who?
nobody nobody Only
foreigners
Foreigners and some
Japanese
everyone
Transfer system None
freedom
movement
- None - no Very limited
of freedom of movement
movement (eg.
Yoshihiro Sakata
(Kintetsu)
Weak regulations,
case-by-case flexible
approach introduced in
2003.
Clear, rule-based
transfer system
Table 2.1 The key features ofthe different models oforganisation
Although the distinctions between categories in the table are not as clear-cut as the table
suggests, what is certain is that since the introduction of the Top League, Japanese
rugby has become more 'fluid' and 'dynamic', with greater opportunities for player
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movement and salary negotiation. Decisions about players' contract status are left to the
clubs and players themselves; however, this has led to inconsistencies and an ambiguous
'hybrid system'. While some players, including all foreigners, are (in reality) on full
professional contracts, the majority are still employees (as is the case at Yamaha RFC -
see Chapter Four). This causes some confusion and friction, as there are often
differences in motivation and dedication between team-mates. This is the case even in
the more 'professional' clubs like Yamaha (see Chapter Four).
This situation has arisen because some companies cannot afford the costs of employing
players on full professional contracts, but also because those players who are worried
about their post-rugby security prefer to retain their shakaijin status (see the
afore-quoted Hiroshi Nagano and Mazda Motors). Japanese professionals also earn
significantly less than foreign professionals. Thus, even though the introduction of the
Top League has changed the 'traditional' shakaijin model towards a fully professional
contracting model, the greater openness and choice available to current Japanese players
has not resulted in all players taking up professional contracts. The Top League has
brought yet more structural changes to Japanese rugby.
2.4 The Top League Competition
In 2003, the JRFU established the Top League competition. This new competition is a
significant step towards a professional league. The professional Super 12 competition in
the Southern Hemisphere and the Heineken Cup in Europe have contributed to huge
improvements in the level of rugby in the two hemispheres. The JRFU is hoping the Top
League will have the same effect in Japan.
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The JRFU's vision is for the diffusion of the game throughout the country in order for
rugby to regain its former popularity. The Top League aims to promote and develop the
game within local communities so as to encourage participation and enjoyment at every
level, and build up the game from the grassroots to the national team. Ultimately, the
JRFU hopes for rugby to compete more effectively with other major professional
spectator sports such as baseball and soccer".
The key new features of the Top League are as follows:
• Instead of three different reginal competitions (Kanto, Kansai and Kyushu), there is
one national league with the top teams from throughout Japan competing. The aim
here is to encourage a sense of 'our region vs. theirs', a sense of belonging. This is
a first step away from a company-team based model towards a more
community-focused model similar to those in Europe and Australasia.
• By creating a smaller, elite competition, the JRFU is aiming to promote closer,
more exciting matches.
• In doing so, the JRFU seeks to raise the level of Japanese rugby, and to
consequently help raise the performance and standing of the national team
Replacing the traditional company championships, the Top League, run from September
to January, consists of a round-robin competition involving the top 12 company teams".
37 Speech of Hiroshi Hibino, the vice president of the JRFU, at the press conference explaining the Top
League Competition (http://www.jrfu-members.com/open/press/index.html).
38 There are promotions and relegations from the Top League: the 11 th_ and 1i h-placed teams are
automatically relegated to the regional leagues, along with the loser of a play-off between the ninth and
10th teams and two best of the top teams in the Top East 10, Top West A and Top Kyushu leagues (see
appendix page 137).
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This new competition includes a total of 66 pool games and seven play-off games
between the top eight teams to decide the overall champion. The top eight also move
onto play in the knockout Microsoft CUp39 tournament in February, as well as the
All-Japan Championship against university and club teams (see Section 2.2). On
September 13 2003, the inaugural season of Top League kicked off, with a crowd of
35,000 watching the opening match between Suntory Sungoliath and Kobelco Steelers
at Tokyo's National Stadium40 (Mitoji, 2003: 12).
However, there are a number of points of contention regarding the new competition.
While the JRFU aims to encourage more competitive balance between company teams'",
this is only happening between the very elite teams. The rich clubs are becoming
stronger, and the poor are becoming weaker, or dropping out. While the new
competition is bringing more media exposure to rugby, the focus has shifted to the top
competition, largely ignoring the lower leagues. And increased media exposure has yet
to result in large crowds - the average Top League gate in 2003 was only 3,500 (JRFU
Annual Report, 2003). This is most likely below the number of spectators needed to
cover costs, and hence puts an additional burden on the company to fund the club.
39 The Microsoft Cup is a new challenge cup tournament introduced along with the Top League.
Administered by the JRFU along the lines of the Top League, the format is modelled on knockout
competitions such as the F.A. Cup, with the tournament winner required to win every match.
40 These two teams played the first match of the new competition because they had been the most
successful teams during the previous ten years or so. This tactic of opening the new league with
historically popular teams mirrored the J.League's opening game featuring the Yokohama Marinos and
Verdy Kawasaki, which as Nissan Motor and Yomiuri Club had been the powerhouse shakaijin soccer
teams of the 1980s (Birchall, 2000).
41 Significantly, the JRFU is not aiming to encourage competitive balance between company and
university teams, only among company teams.
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There have also been many cases of companies being forced to abandon hope of
competing at the top level, or close their rugby clubs. Some companies (especially those
who established their teams in the bubble era) who are unable to fund a Top League
team have wished to carryon with an amateur shakaijin team, such as the case of Mazda
Motors. However, the reduced media exposure at the lower levels brings less PR
benefits for the company, and thus less chance for the team to promote the company,
one of its main purposes. Thus, some companies have disbanded their teams. Between
1997 and 2001, over 200 company teams were discontinued (Australian Financial
Review, 2003:33), leaving approximately 500 still in operation JRFU (JRFU Annual
Report, 2003), a significant decrease. So while rugby's popularity may be growing at
the elite level, the number of company teams and players continues to decline.
Finally, there is also the fundamental problem of differing interpretations of the
meaning of shakaijin rugby between the company teams and the JRFD. Among the Top
League clubs, a more professional attitude is taking root, but the JRFU maintains an
ambiguous position, still wanting to maintain the amateur values that have sustained
rugby for over a hundred years (see Section 2.3). The JRFU considers the Top League to
be a company-based amateur competition, but the reality is clearly different. Companies
like Yamaha (see Chapter Four) are now becoming quite professional in their
employment and training practices. Further, despite the aim of strengthening the
national team, the early success of the Top League has driven the standard of company
team play higher still, and made clubs and players even less willing to participate in
national team matches. This issue will be further discussed in Section 2.5. Thus, there
are no simple solutions and clear descriptions of these aspects of Japanese rugby.
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Ambiguity and conflict best summarise its current state.
2.5 The Current State of the Japanese National Team
Despite the great improvements in the standard of the company game since the 1980s,
the Japanese national team has not developed to the same degree. As outlined in the
previous section, there is no consensus between the JRFU, company teams and elite
players that improving the performance of the national team is the ultimate goal of
Japanese rugby. While there is no doubt that the success of the national team helps to
drive revenues for and interest in the game, it may still be possible to debate the merits
of this concept - some company clubs might prefer to concentrate on domestic
competitions. However, the structure of world rugby places national team competition at
the top, and media coverage is heaviest for prestigious national-team tournaments, such
as the World Cup and the global Sevens Rugby circuit. Japanese rugby has also
traditionally placed great importance and honour on playing for the national team (see
Section 2.1).
The JRFU certainly believes that the national team's welfare should be the highest
priority. However, the company clubs, and an increasing number of players, do not
agree. The clubs control the players' contracts and can prevent the players from
appearing in any other team, including the national team, at will. L'Equipe, writing for
the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaperf (2003), argues that some company clubs do not want
to release top players in case they suffer burnout or injury while outside their control.
Thus, even those players who may want to play for Japan can be easily prevented from
42 L'Equipe (2003). Ragubi okoku Nihon-no yowasa (The weakness of Japan, a strong rugby nation),
Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 October.
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doing so, to the point of becoming scared to ask. Universities also have the same power,
and many block their players from selection for under-19 and under-21 national teams.
Players at the elite universities in particular often see that their career chances may be
better served by helping their university to the championship, rather than playing in a
quickly-forgotten junior international fixture. This lack of emphasis on national
team-selection even extended to the World Cup, the pinnacle of the global game - in the
past, the Japanese team has been decimated by withdrawals ahead of the tournament43.
Thus, it could be said that Japanese rugby has a flat structure, with the national team,
company clubs and university teams all of roughly equal importance. The national team
still carries prestige internationally, but this is diminished by players being unwilling to
sacrifice playing time (and salary payment) from their company club or university. To
promote a stronger national team, the JRFU has to negotiate player availability. There
have been some moves towards this goal - for the 2003 World Cup, the JRFU
negotiated a one-month break in the Top League to allow company players time off, and
paid the players for their trip to Australia44. But there is still no overreaching unity of
purpose among all those connected with Japanese rugby, leading to a fracturing between
the various levels, and also between representatives of factions at the top level.
43 This problem has only become significant since the early 1990s. Before the first Rugby World Cup in
1987, the relatively small number of matches involving the Japanese national team meant that conflict
and overlap with the company and university league was small.
44 The 2003 World Cup was the first time that players had been paid to play for the Japanese national
team; this was deemed necessary to encourage reluctant players to appear. However, the payments were
low, and players were loathe to risk their future with their company team, their main employer.
(http://www.sanspo.com/rugby/japan2003.html; http://www.rugby-japan/japan/japan/2003/index.html).
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Andrew Miller, interviewed by Fujishima (2003:37), urges Japanese rugby to change its
structure, asserting that the importance of the national team needs to be re-emphasised,
He believes that there is a clear connection between many players' ultimate rugby goal
no longer being to play for the national team, and the team's disappointing results. In
my interview with him, he repeated this belief, adding that the JRFU must conduct
structural reform as a first step to changing these attitudes.
Kevin Schuler (Howitt and Haworth, 2002:44) agrees that the ultimate goal for many in
Japanese rugby is no longer playing for the national team. Instead, less encumbered by
JRFU politics, the company teams are more dynamic and proactive in strengthening
their squads. He argues that the real problem faced by the Japanese national team is the
chronic lack of consistency of direction and policy development from the governing
body. The JRFU is believed to be changing their plans and rules far too frequently, as
can be seen in the many changes to the format of the key national tournaments". This
unpredictable decision-making process has led to lack of direction and co-ordination,
and an inability to carry out long-term programmes to improve the national team.
Schuler believes that Japanese rugby first needs to solve its organisational problems,
and urges it to implement a clear pyramid structure, with the national team at the apex.
This would reiterate the place of a stronger domestic competition, such as the Top
League, in terms of developing a successful national team squad. Such change can only
come from the top, the JRFU - however, this would require shifting the balance of
power in Japanese rugby back to the JRFU. And while the JRFU insists that rugby in
45 Of the four national tournaments, the only one to not undergo many changes in recent years is the
National High School Tournament.
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Japan is still amateur, it is both at loggerheads with reality, and unable to address the
changes that the increasingly professional clubs are causing. In such a situation, the
JFRU can only continue to lose control of Japanese rugby.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, I have outlined the development of rugby in Japan, from its introduction
from Britain, to its current state. Through its use in educational institutions, I
emphasised the role of the amateur ethos and its influence on high school and university,
and later company, rugby. The game developed in relative isolation in Japan, which
resulted in the development of distinctive playing styles.
The JRFU has institutionalised the domestic competitions as an amateur game. The
National High-School Tournament has enjoyed strong popularity, though it has waned
recently. The traditional universities (Keio, Waseda and Meiji) dominated the early
development of university rugby, but by popularising the All University Championship,
the JRFU attracted an increasing number of university teams to participate in the new
competition. From the 1980s, the university teams aggressively recruited more and
more top high school players, and then foreign players, to take part in this still-popular
annual competition.
But it has been company rugby that has shown the most development over the last
twenty years. Shakaijin rugby has gone from being a game played after work by
full-time Japanese employees, to a largely professional sport with a significant foreign
influence. Shakaijin rugby in the All-Company Championship, and particularly in its
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latest iteration as the Top League, has drifted away from the amateur ideals long
espoused by the JRFU, causing friction between the JRFU and clubs. The faster
development of the company game has resulted in a shift in the balance of power
towards the clubs/company teams.
As the company clubs control players' contracts and availability for the other
representative teams, the clubs have a large influence over the fortunes of the Japanese
national team. There is no universal agreement that the success of the national team
should take precedence, and people such as Andrew Miller (Fujishima, 2003: 37) and
Kevin Schuler (Howitt and Haworth, 2002:44) believe that this is a cause of the national
team's recent weak performances. Schuler recommends implementing a 'pyramid
structure', placing the national team firmly at the top.
It has been argued that, along with the rapid development of the company game, foreign
players have had a key influence on Japanese rugby over the last two decades. Foreign
players have both helped to improve the level of play, and changed Japanese players'
fundamental attitudes to the game. In the next chapter, I will examine the influx of
foreign players into Japanese rugby.
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Chapter Three: Foreign players in Japanese Company Rugby
3.0 Introduction
This chapter seeks to draw attention to and analyse the influence of foreign rugby
players in Japanese company clubs. It is argued that foreign players have had a key
influence on rugby in Japan for the last two decades. From the 1990s, many company
clubs recruited migrant players to lift the level of their rugby and public profile, and
commentators declared that the era of 'the company game', decided on the strength and
influence of the foreign players, had arrived (Ohtomo, 1998:37). Introduced in 2003, the
new Top League competition (see Section 2.4), provides foreign players with further
opportunities for international mobility.
In this chapter, I will explore the historical context of foreign players in the company
league, migration data, eligibility rules and labour relations regarding foreign
players.The major focus in this chapter is to investigate the motivations, experiences
and views of migrant players, leading to their success or failure in contributing to their
team. I will compare mobility patterns and the teams' recruitment strategies across the
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amateur and professional periods. All of this will help to elucidate how the influx of
foreign players has had an impact on the development of Japanese rugby. Firstly,
however, I will examine the historical background to the treatment of foreign specialists
in Japan, as some of the attitudes formed over a hundred years ago are still manifested
in Japanese sport today.
3.1 Comparative role offoreign specialists in various Japanese organisational fields
Before World War I, Japan had already undergone a remarkable transformation. From
1869 the new government formed after the Meiji Restoration changed Japan from an
isolated, feudalist country into a 'modern' nation. Under slogans like wakonyosai
(Japanese spirit and Western knowledge), Japan imported technology and ideas from
those countries considered to be ideal models in their field46. In order to quickly attain a
deep understanding of the desired fields, the government invited foreign specialists to
advise the fledgling modern nation. Known as oyatoi gaikokujin, or 'employed
foreigners', they were highly respected, and had great influence in reforming the
spheres they had specialist knowledge of. However, they were only permitted to be
short term residents, and were little used outside their field (McCabe, 2003:30).
Foreigners employed in the field of Japanese sport have experienced a variety of
different types of treatment, some far different to the oyatoi gaikokujin. After World War
Two, Japanese baseball developed with an internal focus. During the 1970s, foreign
professional players were brought to Japan for the first time, but their role was very
46 Examples of ideal models used by the Meiji-era government in re-organising its activities include the
Prussian army, the British navy and the French education system.
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different to that of the oyatoi gaikokujin. Dubbed gaijin47 suketto (foreign helpers), they
were well-paid short-term residents. However, crucially, Japanese baseball had already
established an inward-looking cultural environment with strict norms of behaviour, and
unlike the Meiji-era oyatoi gaikokujin, the suketto were not allowed to influence how
the locals played the game (Whiting, 1990:274). They were expected to fit into the
dominant culture of the team, and had no influence on bigger issues such as the team's
organisation and playing style. In fact, most were ultimately dismissed with loud public
and media criticisms of their 'laziness', 'selfishness' and lack of 'fighting spirit' (Kelly,
1998: 96).
Foreign baseball players were thus afforded much less respect than Meiji period oyatoi
gaikokujin. The lack of respect and unwillingness to harness the full potential of the
imported knowledge represented a backwards step for internationalisation in Japan
(McCabe, 2003:60). However, other sports have allowed foreigners more influence.
Soccer, particularly the professional J.League established in 1993, has allowed
foreigners a large, but not overwhelming, degree of influence. Most have been positive
role models and ambassadors, helping to raise the standard of Japanese soccer without
destabilising it. It could be said that J.League soccer has found a balanced position
(McCabe, 2003:60).
47 Linguistically, although gaijin and gaikokujin both translate as 'foreigner', gaijin is a derogatory term
that is used to show cultural distinction between us (insider) and you (outsider). Some people are deeply
offended by the word. By contrast, gaikokujin is a more neutral word, simply meaning 'a person of
another country' (http://www.debito.org/kumegaijinissue.htmI.Japan·sMisguided Kokusaika (www
document).
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The remainder of this thesis will seek to discover the degree of influence of foreign
players in Japanese rugby. I hypothesise that Japanese rugby has allowed foreigners too
much influence, having highly influential, perhaps even dominant roles. This
dominance has extended to the point where it could be argued that the flow of many
players (from New Zealand in particular) fit models of dependency theory. As
commentator Koichi Murakami 48 outlined to me in our interview, company rugby
without foreign players is now unthinkable. The rest of this chapter will investigate the
historical and contemporary context of foreign players in Japanese rugby to illustrate the
breadth and depth of their roles.
3.2 Historical background offoreign rugby players
The first foreign players to play rugby in Japan were two Tongan short-term exchange
students who enrolled at Daito Bunka University in 1974. The main purpose of their
stay in Japan was not only to play rugby, but also to gain knowledge of Japanese abacus
programming under the instigation of King Taufa'ahu Tupou rv". Since then, Tonga
and Daito Bunka University have developed an exchange programme, with a number of
Tongan students going to Daito Bunka solely to play rugby. Since the 1970s, their
influence on the rugby team has been huge, as Daito Bunka won the Kanto University
League title for the first time of many in 1974. In 1980, Tongan students Hopoi Taione
and Nohomuli Taumoefolau, and in 1985 Sinali Latu and Watesoni Namoa, came to
Daito. The two became the driving force behind Daito's domination of the 1986 All
48 I interviewed him in a cafe, Tokyo on 20 June 2002.
49 The Tongan royal family has strong links with the Japanese Imperial household, and King Tupou had
become interested in Japanese abacus techniques. Wanting to spread such techniques further within Tonga,
he asked the two students to travel to Japan to learn the techniques and then pass them on upon their
return to Tonga. However, as rugby pioneers, they arguably had a far greater influence than originally
intended.
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University Championship. As a result of the performance of the Daito Bunka Team, the
awareness among rival university teams of the value of foreign players increased more
and more (Ohtomo, 1998:36).
In 1978, two Oxford graduates (Rod Paley and Peter MacFarlan) became the first
foreign players to sign for a company club when they became contracted to play for
Kobe Steel. But their spell in the team was short, and no foreigners played for company
teams for another seven years. In 1985, two Tongans who played for the Daito Bunka
University team, Taione and Taumoefolau, signed for Sanyo Electric. In the 1990s, the
company clubs began to employ more and more foreign players, beginning a period of
rapid growth in the number of foreign players in the company leagues. From 1991 to
1997, numbers grew from 20 to 88, a 77% increase in six years (see Figure 3.1). Rugby
journalist Nobuhiko Ohtomo (1998:36) commented that the era when the game would
be decided on the strengths of foreign players had begun.
In the 1990 All-Company Tournament the Sanyo team's physical attack, based around
the 'Tongan Trio' (Hopoi Taione, Sinali Latu and Watesoni Namoa) reached the final,
but was derailed by Kobe Steel's Ian Williams (Australia) who scored a last-minute try
in a dramatic victory. In 1992, Ricoh, with Samuel Kaleta (Samoa) and Glen Paterson
(New Zealand) as the pivots on both attack and defence, captured the East Japan league
title in a phenomenal performance. The flow of stars to Japan did not cease. Glen Enis,
who led Canada to the quarterfinals of the 1991 World Cup, joined Suntory, the Fijian
1987 World Cup hero Paulo Nawalu singed for Hino Motors, and in 1994, compatriot
and sevens legend Waisale Serevi joined Mitsubishi Motors Kyoto were among the
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notable foreign players to be recruited into the company leagues (Ohtomo, 1998:37). By
the mid-1990s, many foreign players were used as role models to help encourage young
Japanese players into the game. From New Zealand, apart from NEC's high profile
1997 signing of John Kirwan, Kevin Schuler (Nishin Steel to Yamaha), Graeme Bachop
(Sanix), Jamie Joseph (Sanix), Arran Pene (Kaneka) and Ant Strachan (Kaneka) formed
a procession of current All Blacks coming to Japan.
At the same time, overseas coaching and training methods were brought into many
teams by foreign players and coaches. Current All Blacks assistant coach Wayne Smith
joined the World company team, and Eddie Jones, the current Australian national coach,
has a continuing involvement with the Suntory team", Their involvement spread over a
wide range of team activities, including technical advice, match plans and fitness
techniques. As teachers, they have been highly influential in reshaping the teams they
have worked for, bringing the latest in rugby techniques and advances to Japanese
company teams. However, it is possible that these advances have come at the cost of the
loss of the ideas and techniques refined by the likes of Tetsunosuke Ohnishi.
The standard of rugby in company leagues has greatly improved with the top-class
foreign players around. With the introduction of the Top League and ever-increasing
competitive pressures, company teams are now looking to sign only the very elite
foreign players. This was evident in 2004's signings of superstar All Blacks Leon
MacDonald (Yamaha), Troy Flavell (Toyota Motors), Ron Cribb and Mark Robinson
50 Based in Tokyo, Suntory Rugby Football Club was established in 1980. It has won the All-Japan
Championship three times, the All-Company Championship three times, the Kanto A Company League
five times. Suntory plays a Brumbies-like game as a result of Eddie Jones's influence. During the 2001
tour to Japan by Wales B, the Suntory club defeated (45-41) the touring side, while the national team lost
to Wales B by 40 points.
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(Kobe Steel), Tony Brown (Sanyo Electric), former Wallaby Toutai Kefu (Kubota) and
current Springbok Jaco van der Westhuizen (NEC).
3.3 Migration data offoreign players (1978-2002)
The migration of foreign rugby players depends on the demand of Japanese company
clubs. Since 1978, 361 foreign players and coaches have taken part in the Japanese
company competition. The players have come from 13 countries, mainly New Zealand,
Australia, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, Korea and Canada. The increase in the numbers of
foreign players recruited between 1972 and 2002 (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) indicate that
the market for foreign rugby players has dramatically grown. According to the Japan
Rugby Magazine, the number of foreign players migrating to Japan between 1978 and
2002 has dramatically risen from two to 96 per year, with a high of 99 in 200051 (see
Figure 3.1 and appendix page 139). New Zealand players represent the largest group of
recruited/migrant players, followed by Australians, Fijians, Tongans and Samoans (see
Figure 3.3). In fact, Southern Hemisphere players dominate, accounting for 97% of all
recruits (see Figure 3.3).
51 I created this statistical data on company rugby teams and players from information in the Japan
Rugby Magazine between 1978 and 2002.
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Figure 3.1: Number ofForeign Players
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Figure 3.3 Foreign players in the 2002 season
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Table 3.1 Foreign players in Top League teams in the 2003 season
.NZ
- TONGA
DFIJI
D AUS
• SAMOA
[] OTHER
(Eng land I Korea)
Team NZ ADS FIJI TONGA SAMOA ENG TOTAL
NEe Green Rockets 3 1 4
Kintetsu Liners 1 1 1 1 4
Kubota Spears 2 2 1 1 6
Kobelco Steelers 3 1 4
Suntory Sungoliath 1 2 1 4
Sanyo Wild Knights 5 5
Secom Rugguts 2 2 4
Toshiba Brave Lupus 3 2 5
Sanix Bombs 4 4
Yamaha Jubilo 1 5 6
Ricoh Black Rams 2 1 2 5
World Fighting Bulls 1 2 1 1 5
Total 25 8 8 9 4 1 55
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3.4 Eligibility, Quota and Transfer System ofForeign Players
The JRFU is responsibility for governing the eligibility of foreign players in all
Japanese company clubs. Given the inflow of foreign players as described in Sections
3.2 and 3.3, the JRFU wished to reiterate its policy of keeping the game amateur, aiming
to discourage professionalism and player movement. In 1991, it JRFU outlined its
policy on foreign players in the amateur guidebook, under which, from 1992, the JRFU
restricted the number of foreign players on each team to only two. (Specifically, there is
no limit on the number of foreign players in each squad, but only two may appear on the
field at any time).
This quota system was instituted to prevent foreign players flocking together in one
company team, and to ensure that teams must recruit and help the development of
Japanese players. However, despite this restriction, there are ways to have more than
two foreigners on the field at once as foreign players who play in Japan for three years
are counted as Japanese, even if they do not hold Japanese citizenship. Despite this rule
enabling teams to recruit more foreign players several company teams have encouraged
their foreign players to seek naturalisation".
Also, while the JRFU's 1991 ruling was aimed at limiting the number of foreigners in
Japanese company teams, after it, even more companies then began to actively recruit
foreign players.". This was because it was now officially sanctioned, and, in the context
52 For example, Tongan-bom players Lopeti Oto (Toyota Motors) and Timote Manako (Kubota to Sanyo)
have undergone this process, and are now playing as Japanese. They are hence not considered to be
foreign players any more.
53 The pattern of foreign players' migration to Japan over the last 20 years can be divided into three
phases. From 1991 until the mid-1990s formed the second phase, during which company clubs started
hiring foreign players (well-known players at the end of their careers, or second-tier domestic players) as
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of typically risk-adverse Japanese management, an officially-sanctioned action carries
no official and fewer social repercussions". This was an early example of the difference
in expectations between the JRFU and company clubs, a gap which would later widen
into a gulf (see Section 2.4).
One problem facing new foreign players in the company teams is that JRFU regulations
do not allow them to play until six months after the date of their registration. This has
put Northern Hemisphere recruits at a disadvantage because they face a scheduling
clash; they are still playing at the end of February, and so being unable to register by the
beginning of March, would thus miss the start of the Japanese season in September. By
contrast, if players in the Southern Hemisphere (New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Tonga
and Samoa) register at the beginning of February, they can play for the company club
from September. This has made Southern Hemisphere players more attractive to the
Japanese company teams, reinforcing the pattern shown in Figure 3.3.
The regulation will be relaxed by the JRFU from the 2004-5 season. Rather than a
six-month wait after registration, any player, regardless of length of stay, can play from
the start of the league in September. Moreover, if registered by the end of June and with
the consent of the player's former team, players transferring between clubs can now
semi-professional shakaijin players (see Section 2.3), paid high salaries under an ostensibly amateur
employment contract. The period from the last 1980s until the early 1990s was the first phase, in which
amateur Tongan students (see Section 3.2) and a few other foreign players took up contracts with
companies as amateur company employees, like the Japanese players around them. As more large
companies began to actively establish their rugby clubs and recruit foreign players in a competitive spiral,
the JRFU introduced the above-mentioned limit of 'two' foreign players on the field per team. The third
phrase began after 1996, when professionalism was allowed depending on the relationship between the
company and the individual player.
54 http://www.csuchico.edu/-ms99-/paper.html (Japanese and American management on www
document).
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play for their new team that same year. This new regulation will provide further
opportunities for both foreign and returning Japanese players domestically and
internationally, and especially for Northern Hemisphere players to be recruited by
Japanese teams.
3.5 Recruitment offoreign players
In the past ten years, the conditions surrounding the recruitment of foreign players have
changed dramatically. In the amateur era, the company teams relied heavily on large and
powerful foreign players to help the team as suketto. Since rugby became professional,
the number of foreign players from the southern hemisphere (New Zealand, Australia,
Tonga, Fiji and Samoa) has increased considerably. The beginning of the Top League
competition in 2004 saw the number of teams in the top competition limited to 12. Most
top teams do not merely seek to recruit foreign players but are putting a renewed
emphasis on recruiting and developing top Japanese university players as appropriate to
the needs of the team. This is because Japanese players have become stronger and more
skilful. Therefore, recruiting foreign players alone cannot bring a competitive
advantage.
The Top League competition has also arguably improved the overall quality of elite
company games, with a much more physical style emerging across the league. By
implication, this means that a higher standard of foreign player is needed. As a result,
apart from the rule of 'two foreign players on the field', three or four foreign players on
the reserve bench has become the norm. Table 3.1 shows that there are 46 foreign
players, with an average of four per Top League team (see Table 3.1). This has worked
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around the ostensible rule of 'two foreign players on the field'.
After the advent of professionalism in 1996, the recruiting strategies of the company
teams changed rapidly. Many of the top teams looked to sign leading Southern
Hemisphere players before February, to meet the registration requirements for the
Japanese season. In particular, negotiations with New Zealand players were carried out
from the end of the previous year's New Zealand playing season, that is, from around
September. Negotiations with players contracted to the NZRFU (NZRFU Year Book
2003), that is, All Blacks and Super 12 players, were limited to a one-month window in
October.
However, Japanese company teams actively scouted and made contact with players
before their NZRFU and provincial union contracts ended. Many companies employ
rugby agents and/or have networks through foreign players who have returned home
after playing for that company's team. Since the start of the Top League in 2004, the
contract negotiation period has been extended, with the JRFU hoping for more security
in the foreign player transfer market. However, the players and their agents generally
accept the highest offer from any of Super 12 teams, European clubs and Japanese
company clubs. That is to say, in a global rugby market where player transfers between
clubs are not regulated by the IRB, there is open competition between rich Northern
Hemisphere clubs and fiercely competitive Top League teams for the most famous
players. Thus the price of star players can be expected to continue to rise, and it will be
only the few richest clubs that can secure the services of the top players.
55
The case ofNew Zealand players
Matheson (2000:28 cited in Obel, 2001) explains the flow of players and coaches to
northern hemisphere clubs, companies and unions by highlighting the increasingly
uneven economic opportunities in the game. According to NZ RUGBY WORLD (1998),
Super 12 and NPC players can earn the equivalent of the standard NZ$150,000 All
Blacks contract when they play overseas. In New Zealand, a Super 12 player gets only
NZ$65,000, while a 'top of the line' All Black can earn more than NZ$300,000 a season
in New Zealand.
My own research reveals that contracts may in fact have increased significantly since
1998. For most top Japanese company teams, there is bonus on signing the contract, but
the club offers a preparation fee, which includes accommodation, Japanese language
lessons, private car and health insurance in the first year. A recruiter with a top company
team explained to me that there are three different salary bands - All Blacks, ¥25
million (NZ$358,000) 55, Super 12 players, ¥15 million-¥20 million
(NZ$215,000-NZ$358,000) and NPC players, ¥1O million (NZ$143,000). Clearly, the
substantial salaries on offer would seem to be a factor in players' decisions to migrate to
Japan. In recent years, the size of the deals of top-class players has escalated
dramatically. A few rich company teams offer extraordinary deals to 'superstars'. For
example, Toutai Kefu signed a three-year contract worth ¥120 million (NZ$1.7
millionj" with Kubota, and Troy Flavell signed for two years for over ¥98 million
(NZ$1.4 million) with Toyota Motors. The Northern Hemisphere free market for top
55 I calculated NZ dollar-Yen exchange at a rate of 75 yen to the dollar.
56 Had Kefu stayed in Australia, it would have taken him approximately six seasons to earn the
equivalent salary as a national and Super 12 player.
(http://www.theage.co.au/articlesI2003/02/01/1043804571583.html).
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players, as opposed to the centralised, controlled market in New Zealand, is clearly
providing great rewards for elite players (interview with a recruitment manager, 1 April
2004).
The case ofPacific Island players
In the case of Pacific Island players, the introduction of professionalism has certainly
provided them with opportunities for social and economic mobility. Their mobility
patterns - leaving the Islands at relatively young age - emphasise the weak economic
and rugby infrastructure in the Islands relative to more advanced rugby nations like
Japan. The introduction of professionalism has also changed recruitment strategies in
Japan. A company team recruit manager told me that while the team has a large budget,
it conversely faces increasing pressures and demands (interview with a recruitment
manager, I April 2004). He explains how Fijian players are willing to accept less money
than New Zealand players. In recent years, the recruiters have taken on primarily Fijians
not likely to earn Super 12-level salaries, that is, on less expensive and usually
multi-year contracts. Fijians are also reputedly more willing to compromise to secure
contract extensions. A Pacific Island player can cost about half as much as a NZ Super
12 player, enabling teams to sign more foreign players for the same money.
Moreover, Tongan players are often recmited from high school or university, with their
living costs covered by scholarships. They then proceed to play for company teams (and
sometime the Japanese national team), a pattern being followed by more and more
players through expanding family ties and social networks. Current or former Tongan
players who are trusted by the company clubs are often asked to recommend promising
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young players in Tonga, who are then scouted by the club.
By contrast, Pacific Island players who have played professionally outside the Islands
and come to Japan straight from the Islands form a cheap source of labour for company
teams. Another benefit, from the company's point of view, is that there is a growing
view in the global rugby market that the physical power and agility of Island players is
superior to Caucasian and Asian players, and that power is perfectly suited to the style
of rugby currently in vogue. Allied to this is the so-called 'Fijian magic" the flair and
spark they bring to the game. In addition, critically, there are cultural similarities
between the Island countries and Japan (such as age based hierarchical relation) that
helps the players assimilate into and better understand Japanese rugby culture (Suzuki,
1986:45).
Unlike the case of New Zealand players, who can still earn a living in the professional
New Zealand rugby infrastructure, a consequence of this migration of Pacific Island
players to Japan (or New Zealand, Australia and Europe) is the 'under-development' or
'dependent development' of rugby in the Islands. This situation parallels the dependent
development of Irish and Scottish soccer (McGovern, 2000) and of Dominican baseball
(Klein, 1989). Yet, this should not be understood as exclusively a "zero sum game"
(McGovern, 2000:415). Obel (1996:196) argues that despite the tendency to select
overseas-based players to the Pacific Island national team, the skills of these players
have improved the national teams' international standing and can further the national
rugby union's ability to obtain sponsorship. However, the majority of the benefit of
57 The Fiji national team is one of the top seven-a side rugby teams in the world. They feature a fast,
unpredictable and physically confrontational playing style that poses great challenges for their opponents.
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hiring low-cost Pacific Island labour to fill specific team needs accrues to the Japanese
company team. On the contrary, as outlined above, New Zealand players benefit from
high, guaranteed salaries. In this case, the objectives and motivations of foreign players
in Japan of different nationality and ethnicity are likely to differ.
3.6 Motives and Objectives offoreign players
abel (1999:180-2) argues that the new professional opportunities in the northern
hemisphere, which provoked these migration patterns, are characterised by competition
between wealthy rugby clubs in Europe and Japan for New Zealand players. While
professionalism has increased the playing opportunities for New Zealand players in
New Zealand through the establishment of the Super 12 competition, there is not room
for the entire player base in the five Super 12 franchises, causing a surplus of players
that Japanese company teams seek to employ. Clubs in Europe and Japan can offer
higher-value contracts to New Zealand players than the NZRFU can.
Additionally, an increasing emphasis on the selection of young players 58 means that
established (but still not old) players miss selection for Super 12 teams and the All
Blacks at a younger age than in the amateur era. Coaches under pressure to win every
week are picking players ever more strictly on form, which means that selection to the
All Black team and even for the Super 12 teams is not guaranteed from year-to-year and
week-to-week. Many older (late 20s and above) players see their chances of selection
slipping away, and look for other playing opportunities overseas. This was one of the
58 For example, at the 2003 World Cup, coach John Mitchell left out veterans Anton Oliver, Taine
Randell, Andrew Mehrtens and Christian Cullen, in favour of young guns like Corey Flynn (at the age of
22), Ali Williams (22), Daniel Carter (21), Ma'a Nonu (21) and Joe Rokocoko (20).
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reasons a New Zealand player (ex-All Black and Super12 player with Waikato Chiefs)
cited for considering and ultimately accepting an offer from a Japanese club (interview
with #1, 14 November 2003). In short, the increasingly difficult selection environment
at home may push players to think about playing for overseas clubs, fuelling what I
characterise as a 'spiral of departing experience'.
These players are looking for new contract opportunities, and increasing numbers are
finding them in Europe and Japan. In this research, I found out that Japan is an
attractive destination for top-class New Zealand players, who are looking at
opportunities outside the Super 12 competition. Apart from the lucrative contracts on
offer for New Zealand and Australian players.", in particular, the close proximity to
home, relatively short competitive season, and lower physical demand make Japan an
attractive destination. A good example is player #16°, who went to Kobe Steel after the
end of the 2003 Super 12 competition. He described in an interview with me how he
enjoyed playing his first season of rugby in Japan. His main motive to play in Japan was
a need for 'change' and 'opportunity' in his rugby career. He felt a bit older and had
been injured. He wanted to do something different and hired an agent to look around
overseas clubs for the best deals (interview with player #1, 14 November 2003).
Obel (2001:192) argues that the introduction of professionalism encouraged Pacific
Islanders (Samoa, Tonga and Fiji) to seek playing opportunities in New Zealand and in
the northern hemisphere. Pacific Island players often acknowledge that a lack of
59 Players set to star in the Top League in 2003: New Zealand: Royce Willis (to Kobe Steel from the
chiefs), Eroni Clarke (to Ricoh from the Blues, Deon Muir (to Sanix from the Chiefs) and Nick Collins
(to Sanyo Electric from the Chiefs). Australia: Cameron Pither (to Kubota from ACT Brumbies).
60 I interviewed him in the training field of the Kobe Steel Club on 14 November 2003.
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domestic tournaments'" and of full-time professional employment opportunities is the
main factor pushing them towards international migration, and the likes of Japanese
company teams offer attractive destinations. Pacific Island players are spread across the
major rugby markets in the Northern (England, France, Italy and Japan) and Southern
(New Zealand and Australia) hemispheres. Japanese company clubs are no exceptions.
My survey provides an indication of the presence of Pacific Island players in the
company leagues (see Figure 3.3). This number has increased with the introduction of
professionalism in 1996. Prior to moving to Japan, these Pacific Island players played
for their country and were contracted to NZ (and Australian) Super 12 teams or
European clubs. In the 2003-4 season, 14 Pacific Island players were included in the
Top League teams. All of those players represented a Pacific Island nation'" (five
Fijians, four Tongans and four Samoans) in the 2003 RWC. Japanese company clubs
clearly form an attractive rugby market for these Pacific Island players.
In a TV interview on the IRB's weekly programme 'The World of Rugby', June 2003,
the captain of Tongan national team, Inoke Afeaki, talked about relations between Tonga
and Japan. He noted that one of the most prominent aspects of the friendly relationship
between the peoples of two nations is sport, especially rugby, In fact, several Tongan
students play for strong Japanese universities (such as the Daito Bunka University) or
61 Apart from a few test matches against other relatively weak nations (such as the South Pacific
Triangular tournament), playing opportunities are limited in Fiji (although Fiji successfully competes in
the IRB Sevens Series), Tonga and Samoa.
62 Tonga: Benhur Kivalu (Kintetsu) . Inoke Afeaki (Secom) . Ipolito Fenukitau (Ricoh) . Pierre Hola
(Kobe). Fiji: Alivereti Doviverata (Yamaha) . Alifereti Doviverate (Yamaha) . Seta Tawake (Hino) .
Alfred Uluinayau (Suntory) . Norman Ligairi (Yamaha) . Vilimoni Delasau (Yamaha). Samoa: Leo
Lafaiali'i (Sanyo) . Peter Poulos (NTT DoCoMo Kansai) . Brian Lima (Secom) . Romi Ropati
(Toyota).
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company teams, and a few of them are also members of the Japanese national team. A
Fijian player, who I interviewed at the Yamaha RFC, told me a similar story. He
believes that Fijian representative players playing for overseas clubs is quite normal and
acceptable. His view is that young local Fijian players are being encouraged to chase
professional opportunities overseas as a result of a lack of properly organised games at
home, and he supports their moves overseas (Interview with player #3, 22 January
2004).
3.7 Foreign' players' views and experiences
It was often mentioned to me in interviews that for most players, other than those from
the Pacific Islands't', living and playing in Japan is a difficult experience. Starting a new
life in Japan can be both rewarding and challenging. Different customs, rules and
conventions can become sources of confusion, and many of the players mentioned that
the language barrier provided a constant barrier in their quest for knowledge. Andrew
McCormick64 explained how he felt very uneasy at the beginning of his stay in Japan,
not knowing a single word of Japanese and being alone in a strange land. The barriers
that lie between Japan and New Zealand were not limited to simply language issues or
differences in lifestyles.
63 In my research, I have found that players who grew up in the Pacific Islands tend to fit into the culture
of Japanese rugby more easily than those from New Zealand. This latter category also includes those of
Pacific Island descent, perhaps because the traditional culture of the Islands, which as described in
Section 2.2 has strong parallels with that of Japan's, is stronger among those raised there than in New
Zealand.
64 In this thesis, I have generally avoided naming the players to maintain their privacy. However, in
certain cases, the respondents can be easily identified from the nature of their replies, and hence can be
named; Andrew McCormick is one of these. I interviewed him in a cafe, Tokyo, on 20 June 2002).
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He said,
I was very lonely during the first year, but after a while what I did was
to spend a lot of time with many Japanese rugby teammates. Knowing
players and getting involved with the team was how I improved my
Japanese and began to understand Japanese culture (interview with
Andrew McCormick, 20 June 2002).
Some of the foreign players whom I interviewed moved with their family to Japan, but
then encountered many more everyday challenges and hurdles. Company teams based in
cities provide more chances to interact with other foreigners than those in regional
towns. A former Canterbury Crusaders and Bay of Plenty player has lived in Kobe with
his wife and two children, a city with a large foreign community, and reported feeling
no culture shock. Additionally, several American professional baseball players from the
Hanshin Tigers65 team lived in the same 'foreigner apartment' block. Thus, they had
people in the same social situation to talk with about everyday problems (interview with
#2 player, 14 November 2003). By contrast, teams based in smaller centres or rural
areas gave foreign players few chances to meet other foreigners, and problems festered,
often resulting in homesickness or culture shock. Kevin Schuler 66 had such an
experience on first coming to Japan (see Section 4.3). These interview results parallel
with the theory of Stead and Maguire (1996:46), who argue that sports migrants can
encounter difficulties in trying to maintain relationships with family and friends back
home.
65 The Hanshin Tigers, the most popular team in the Osaka-Kansai area, were formed in 1935. In the
2003 season, the Tigers won the Central League baseball championship for the first time in 18 years. Four
'foreign suketto' players, Trey Moore (starting pitcher), Lou Pote (relief pitcher), Jeffrey Williams
(closing pitcher) and George Arias (infielder), played a key role in helping the team capture the league
title.
66 Kevin Schuler, like Andrew McCormick, is a well-known player who can be easily identified from the
nature of his interview replies, and thus can be named. I interviewed him in his office on 14 November
2003).
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There were more than a few examples of families unable to cope with the lifestyle and
who had returned home, leaving the player to live alone for the playing season, and to
visit his family in the off-season (interview with Andrew McCormick, 20 June 2002)
McCormick explained that many foreign players he knew had particular problems with
their children's education in a country with such vastly different culture, customs and
language. In a few cases, such as those of Tongan Sinali Latu and New Zealander Kevin
Schuler (players who have lived and played rugby for several years in Japan), their
families adapted to living in Japan and their children went to local schools.
However, they were indeed a small minority, as most players, preferred short-term
contracts so that they could return home before their children reached school age. In his
interview with rugby journalist Hiroshi Suzuki (1986:41-5), Latu, a pioneer foreign
player, argues "on experiencing Japanese practices and rules for the first time, I was
surprised. However, when in Rome you must do as the Romans do. Going by this
proverb, I threw myself into the Japanese way".
In Japan, foreign professional players like Schuler and player #1 have common daily
routines, with Japanese language lessons and weight training every morning, and team
training in the evening. All of the foreign players that I talked to were shocked at the
emphasis on long, hard daily training regimes. At the top level in Japan, training
typically involves hard sessions six days a week for a whole year.
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Kevin Schuler opined that
We train for such a long time. On the other hand, there is a lot of time
to get things right, but a lot of training does not become enjoyable,
because we simply train too much. We train for games, not play to
train, train and train, even though we have only 10 games in the
season. It is basic Japanese philosophy that the more training you do,
the better results you get. Japanese coaches and players put more
emphasis on quantity than on quality, but we, foreign players are
slowly trying to change that (interview with Kevin Schuler, 18 June
2002).
This quote illustrates the methods involved in 'managed rugby' (see Section 2.2), and
the continuing influence of the seishin ideology. Long, hard training sessions are
designed to make the players physically and mentally strong, in the same way that high
school rugby teams have trained since before World War Two.
3.8 Failed migrant players
Japanese rugby has a clearly defined cultural practice, featuring anti-individualism,
strict hierarchy and rules of behaviour, plus ideals of hard work and importance of team
harmony (Light, 1999:114). It is strictly organised around a set of rules and systems
characteristics of Japanese-style management, which is often presented as a distinctive
Japanese accomplishment (De Mente, 2004:305 and Nakane, 1984:38-9, 60-3). Many
foreign players experience tension between themselves and Japanese players, given the
different pressures and expectations placed on them (see Section 2.3). Japanese players
also found the imports threatening to the fabric of the team environment, weakening the
teamwork ethic with excess emphasis on the individual. These attitudes and suspicions
of one group against the other reflect issues common to the presence of foreigners in
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broader Japanese society (Sugimoto, 1997).
In the past, some foreign players have gone to Japan with little pre-departure orientation
or post-arrival guidance. Thus, they often did not know the expectations they had to live
up to, and the norms of the aforementioned cultural practice they had to adapt to. These
issues mentally overwhelmed some players, arguably stopping them from performing
on the rugby field. For example, Adrian Cashmore (ex-All Black and Auckland Blues
star) took up a three-year contract with Toyota Motors in 1999 and Clark McLeod
(ex-New Zealand A and Canterbury Crusader) a two-year deal with Suntory in 2002.
However, neither fitted into the Japanese style of game, nor the team's cultural
environment, and found themselves spending much time on the reserve bench. Their
contracts were not renewed, and they returned to New Zealand to play in the NPC.
I discussed the issue of a potential culture clash or culture shock experienced by foreign
players with a top company rugby team manager'" who explained to me that they have
carefully changed their foreign player and recruitment strategy. In the past, foreign
players were given great freedom, but were considered as being a bad influence on the
team (interview with a company team manager, 1 April 2004). In fact, some foreign
players were overshadowed by controversy and disciplinary problems. A minority of
cases caused some serious problems and a few foreign players behaved very badly.
Excessive aggressiveness on the field caused major problems for the likes of centre Te
Rua Tipoki of World, (ex-New Zealand Maori and North Harbour, now Bay of Plenty).
His violent conduct in the match on November 8, 2003 against Toshiba led to
67 I interviewed him on the rugby field in the Osaka University of Health and Sport Sciences on 1 April
2004).
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complaints being made by opposing teams. Tipoki earned a three-week suspension from
the JRFU Judicial Committee for punching an opposing player in the face. As a result
he missed two matches - which is significant given the teams only play 10 in the Top
League season. Despite it being only a third-round match, it was his second violent
outburst that season'". In Japanese company teams, whose team image is so closely
linked to the parent company's, any such behaviour directly reflects on the company's
reputation. Thus, Tipoki's individual acts were considered to cause the entire company
severe embarrassment, and in addition, had a negative impact on the image of all
foreign players in Japan.
3.9 Reflections on the influence offoreign players
Over the last ten years, company rugby in Japan has experienced increasing
international contact, through overseas tours and camps, and the influx of high-profile
international players and coaches (Light, 1999: 107). Underlying the issues surrounding
foreign players is clearly a corporatist mindset on the part of the employer. Companies
see the foreign players as an efficient means of strengthening the team and promoting
the company through the team. The players decide to come to Japan to secure their
income, and the companies are looking to build the team up quickly in the face of the
rapidly strengthening domestic competition. Both sides benefit from the player
movement, and as they are mutually dependant, the player flow is highly unlikely to
stop.
68 http://www.sanspo.com/rugby/top/rg20031l/rg200311120 l.html.
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The standard of company rugby in Japan has greatly improved through the presence of
top-class foreign players and coaches. The domination of the company leagues by the
new company teams is an example of this. Foreign players have served as valuable role
models to help Japanese players improve their technical skills and playing styles.
However, the influx of foreign players also presents problems for company teams. At
the extreme end of the spectrum, there are teams, which have abandoned developing
Japanese players in favour of recruiting foreigners. In such a situation, foreign players
are no longer suketto, relegated to a narrow role, but they instead had an influence far
beyond their small numbers.
It is also possible that the demand for foreign players has threatened the development of
young Japanese players, and deprived them of opportunities (see Section 4.5). It is very
difficult to compete for a place in the team against a star foreign player, and
opportunities for Japanese players are sometimes blocked (see the example of Wataru
Murata in Section 5.3). More significantly, the introduction of foreign players has
changed the traditional domestic competition. The inaugural Top League competition
(see Section 2.4) quickly changed the nature of the company competition, with
increasing financial inequality opening up a large gap in team performances between
those at the top that can afford to employ superstar foreign players, and those in lower
leagues that cannot. The radical change in the company leagues and competitions forced
teams to hire more and more quality foreign players to retain their status and profile in
the Top League. In a sense, teams become locked into a competitive spiral of simply
hiring the best foreign players.
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3.10 Summary
In this chapter, I have discussed the strong influence of foreign players in the Japanese
company league. In 1992, the JRFU imposed a limit of two foreign players on the field
per team to slow the inflow of foreign players, but paradoxically, more foreign players
were recruited. The standard and public profile of rugby rose in the 1990s at the same
time as foreign players' participation increased. Many top company clubs have relied on
imported talent, and many of the leagues' stars have been foreign players. The transfer
system has until very recently favoured Southern Hemisphere players, and New Zealand
recruits, in particular, have been numerous and influential. These migrant players are
primarily dependent on the demand of Japanese company teams, as they form the most
economically powerful league in Japanese rugby.
Foreign sources have added new dimensions to company teams' play. In Japanese
baseball teams, foreigners have often been marginalised to narrow roles. However by
contrast, in company rugby teams they have had a variety of responsibilities, and have
had a broad influence. While some have been suketto, many have been inspirational
leaders, teachers of technical skills, coaching methods and playing styles. The patterns
and trends of foreign players in the company league illustrate the clubs' continuing
reliance on foreign players. However, the players want contract and career security, and
although the balance of power remains tilted towards the rich clubs, this two-way flow
of influence forms a pattern of mutually dependent development.
The different objectives and motivations of foreign players over the last two decades
were examined in this chapter. In the case of New Zealand players, (prior to 1996) the
69
majority of them were looking to the Japanese company clubs to bolster their earnings
at the end of their rugby careers (under the amateur regulation). Despite the
controversial restriction imposed by the NZRU that selection for All Blacks requires a
player to be playing in New Zealand, the attraction of playing overseas (especially
Europe and Japan) has been greater for players who are towards the end of their careers
and/or who perceive themselves to be out of contention for selection for the All Blacks.
In the case of Pacific Island players, the introduction of professionalism has provided
them with opportunities for social and economic mobility, because of the weak
economic infrastructure of Pacific Island rugby and the lack of opportunity for young
talent. From the company club's point of view, the best strategy is to recruit many
Pacific Island players on less-expensive contracts, while top-class New Zealand (and
Australian and South African) players are more likely to take up lucrative short-term
contracts. In summary, salaries for foreign players can be said to be a function of those
players' motivations and expectations. Thus, while famous New Zealand players
demand salaries that are multiples of what they could have earned playing for the All
Blacks, the lower earning potential of Pacific Island players at home affects the amount
of money they expect to receive. Even if they are paid the same multiple of their salary
at home as the New Zealand players, this still makes them significantly cheaper for
Japanese company teams to hire.
The inaugural Top League competition has increased the pressure to import foreign
players, because the 12 League teams are now more likely to hire four-five foreign
players to sustain their position at the top of the league table. This environment
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produces financial and competitive inequalities, with only Top League teams able to
hire the biggest foreign stars, and the gap to lower-division teams is becoming very
large.
But as well as the inequalities between teams, there are also points of difference
regarding the dynamics within teams. While foreign players are often very highly paid
and motivated, many of their Japanese teammates are still paid as regular company
employees. In the next chapter, I focus on the Yamaha Rugby Football Club and
consider the influence of foreign players and the relationship between them and their
Japanese team-mates.
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Chapter Four: Foreign players in the Yamaha RFC
4.0 Introduction
In Chapter Two, I outlined the changes that have taken place in Japanese rugby for the
last three decades. I emphasised in particular the trend away from the game's amateur
and shakaijin (company) past to a more professional manner of organisation. In Chapter
Three, I explored the history and broad influence of foreign players in Japanese rugby.
While foreign players have helped to raise the standard of Japanese rugby, their
influence has worked in many directions, and the process of integration and change has
not been without conflict and controversy. In Chapter Four, I provide a case study of the
involvement of foreign players in the Yamaha Rugby Football Club.
The chapter will follow three broad themes. The first is the history of how the Yamaha
company team has come to play and organise itself more professionally, which will be
covered on Section 4.1. The second theme, discussed in Section 4.2, focuses on labour
relations between the club officials, new recruits and local players. The state of labour
relations has changed from the amateur to the more professional era, and foreign players
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have had a strong influence in this progression. This leads into the third theme, which is
the issue of equality between foreign and Japanese players, in terms of salary, social
status and the expectations placed on them by companies.
This theme is explored through three interview-based case studies of representative
players; New Zealander Kevin Schuler in Section 4.3, a representative Fijian migrant
player in Section 4.4, and a star Japanese player in Section 4.5. The aim of these
sections is to explore the impact of foreign players in the Yamaha RFC. Foreign players
are of vital importance, as they can affect the atmosphere and performance of the team
as a whole, and hence the likelihood of attaining the team's goals. This chapter is based
on interviews with players, coaches and administrators of the Yamaha team during the
2002-3 and 2003-4 seasons.
4.1 A BriefHistory and Current Philosophy of the Yamaha RFC
Based in Shizuoka, central Japan, Yamaha RFC was first established as a corporate
welfare and fitness vehicle by parent company Yamaha Motor in 1984 (see appendix
page 140). In the 1980s, a company's promotion of competitive and social sport was
considered to have a major effect on its reputation, and many companies established and
actively developed new sports teams (Top League, 2003). Yamaha Motor was also one
of these new teams. From 1987, the Yamaha club was reorganised by its parent
company to become a competitively-oriented entity, with the ultimate goal of winning
the national company tournament. After promotion to the C division three and then B
division two of the Kansai Company League, the team won promotion into the Kansai A
(division one) Company League in 1997.
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However, past national company champions such as Kintetsu69, Toyota Motors" and
Kobe Steel." play in this league, leaving seemingly few chances for Yamaha to take the
title. However, despite such powerhouse opposition, in 2002, less than 20 years after the
team's establishment and five years after winning promotion to the first division,
Yamaha won its first league championship title. Building on this achievement, the team
advanced into the inaugural Top League in the 2003 season. Yamaha came third in the
Top League competition, with an eight-win, one-loss, two-draw record. After that,
playing off against the eight best Top League teams in the Microsoft Cup, the team
secured fourth place, and in the All-Japan Championship, advanced to the semifinals for
the first time ever. Three players from Yamaha were also selected to the Japanese
national team for the 2003 RWC - locks Hajime Kiso and Naoya Kubo, and halfback
Wataru Murata.
69 Kintetsu, a major Kansai private railway operator, established its rugby club in 1929. Kintetsu has won
the All-Japan Championship three times, the All-Company Championship eight times, and the Kansai A
Company League 17 times.
70 Based near Nagoya, Toyota Motors Rugby Club was established in 1941. It has won the All-Japan
Championship three times, the All-Company Championship four times, and was promoted to the Top
League for the 2004 season.
71 Based in Kobe, near Osaka, Kobe Steel Rugby Club was established in 1928. It has won the All-Japan
Championship nine times, the All-Company Championship nine times (including seven straight wins
from 1988 to 1994), and won the inaugural Top League.
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Under the influence of Jubilo Iwata72 in the J. League, and even more so since the
inauguration of the Top League, company clubs' attitudes have been transformed,
towards a more professional style of club management. However, there is no one single
model of professionalism - as discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, the company teams are
given a large amount of leeway by the JRFU. Yamaha's guiding thought is 'Looking
towards professional rugby', a clear statement of its aims to become a fully professional
organisation. This is evidenced by the growing demands on players to perform at the
level demanded by the team, or leave the team (see the rebuilding phase described in
Section 4.2).
The team manager " of the Yamaha club told me in an interview,
While it has only been 20 years since the team was founded, in those
20 years Yamaha has built a solid and distinctive team culture and
identity. We love rugby with everything we have. In the near future,
the chance will come for us to reach the very top of the Japanese
game. And we want the Yamaha name to be known worldwide as a
pro rugby club that attracts the attention of other clubs and top
players. We want to manage in a way that will fascinate and appeal
(interview with team manager, 18 January 2002).
72 The Yamaha Football Club was established in 1972 as the company soccer club. The team was
promoted to the First Division of the Japan Soccer League (JSL) in 1979, winning the league
championship in 1988. Yamaha Motor owns and is the main sponsor of the team, named Jubilo Iwata in
1992. However, the Yamaha Football Club Co., Ltd was established as a more independent financial
entity to carry out all aspects of club management, including sponsorship, membership and merchandising.
The team was again promoted to the professional 1. League in 1994. After winning the overall season
titles in 1997 and 1999, Jubilo became the first team ever to win both stages in 2002. In 2004, the team
won the Emperor's Cup for the second time, following its first win in 1983 (Jubilo-Iwata, 2002;
http://www.jubilo-iwata.co.jp). Foreign managers and players (mainly from Brazil and Europe) have
made a positive- opinion just say what their involvement has meant- or refer to what others have said
about foreign players contribution to the team for the last ten years. For example, Brazilian star Dunga led
the development of a new, success-oriented team culture after the team's promotion to the J. League
(Birchall, 2000).
73 I interviewed him in his office on 18 January 2002). Yamaha's team manager has held his current
position for two years, and has a sound knowledge of the team's history and aims. I interviewed him in
his office at the Yamaha rugby team dormitory on 18 January 2002.
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As a Top League team, the Yamaha club is required by the parent company and
competitive pressures to create a competitive team, to promote the Top League
competition, and also to think of the ways they can contribute to their community and
their supporters. Part of the Top League vision (see Section 2.4) is the development of
community-based support for the rugby club. Yamaha holds itself out as promoting
sports together with their hometown community, working to promote rugby and soccer
alongside Jubilo Iwata (Yamaha RFC, 2003). Until recently Yamaha's support has
mostly come from Yamaha employees and their families, with attachment to the team
based on direct links to the club through the parent company. To increase its
community-based support (among people not affiliated with the Yamaha Company) and
improve the club's image, Yamaha has set up an official website, featuring up-to-date
team information, ticket sales and fan club membership.
The Yamaha rugby club's efforts to attract community-based support in its hometown of
Iwata City in Shizuoka Prefecture have been clearly influenced by the activities of the
Jubilo Iwata soccer team. Differing from the J.League's emphasis on local support, the
Top League envisions its teams building support for rugby through a nationwide
campaign, however Yamaha has interpreted this with a more locally-oriented bent
(JSports, 2004). This difference in league vision warrants further consideration,
however it is outside the main focus of this thesis, that of foreign players in Japanese
rugby. Moreover, to expand the popularity of Japanese rugby, they make sure that the
Yamaha rugby school and clinic is fully equipped and put great effort into the
development of junior rugby.
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4.2 Team Strategy and Labour Relations
O'Brien and Slack (1999:24-43) argue that professionalism and commodification have
forced significant changes in the organisational structure and culture in rugby football
union clubs in the United Kingdom. Japan is no exception, and the momentum for
change has increased into the Top League era. The move to a more professional league
has put pressure on the company teams to create a strong team and promote a high
quality game to retain Top League status and attendant company prestige. Nauright and
Chandler (1999: xxiii) argue that professionalism has not just affected the manner in
which players are expected to train and perform, but has just as critically affected the
attitudes of club officials who have been responsible for the well-being and day-to-day
running of the club.
This change in attitude has also been evident at the Yamaha club. Yamaha has recently
employed fulltime staff such as specialist coaches, video analysts, fitness specialists and
physiotherapists, interpreters and media liaisons. These administrators, who during the
1980s may have spent half their time on regular office work and half on rugby, now
devote all of their time to the rugby club. From the players' weight training routines,
practice schedules and nutrition regimes to media and community relations, Yamaha is
becoming a more and more professional rugby organisatiori'".
74 As outlined in the previous footnote, the current pattern of organisation at Yamaha could be described
as 'mixed', or not yet fully professional. However, in any case it contrasts sharply with the pattern in the
shakaijin era, in which players were required to put in a full day's work until 5P.M., before beginning
their rugby training.
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For example, foreign players and professional Japanese players, a typical day at Yamaha
involves training every morning at the gym, with various weights and dynamic sessions.
This is followed in the afternoon with sessions designing game plans, selected areas
(forwards and backs) that need extra work, and up to two hours' team training. Japanese
players employed as regular employees are given special permission to leave the office
by early afternoon to be in time for the afternoon sessions. This stands in clear contrast
to the amateur (l960s) and various shakaijin models (l980s and early 1990s) described
in Section 2.3; amateur players practiced only after they had completed their office
duties by 5P.M. The difference in training schedules between players who are
professional and those who are regular employees is also an everyday manifestation of
the difference in contractual status between professional and non-professional players,
also discussed in Section 2.3.
The move towards professionalism has also had an impact on labour relations between
the club officials and players. The JRFU, clinging to its amateur ethos (see Section 2.3),
has not laid out a clear definition of the shape of labour relations between company
clubs and players. Instead, it has left contracting arrangements to the two parties, and as
a result, labour relations have developed differently among the company teams. Factors
such as the team-building strategy and financial wealth of the company club influence
its will and ability to recruit foreign players and hire Japanese players on professional
contracts.
78
Recruiting foreign superstar players is considered to be a vital part of Yamaha's
team-building strategy. Until recently, the recruitment of foreign players alone could
increase the gap in ability between company teams through brute strength. However, in
the last few years, a gradual increase in the abilities of Japanese players has seen the
quality of the club game in Japan jump, with a more physical style emerging across the
leagues, and the physical power of all the teams is now quite similar. As a result, the
Yamaha club has looked less to recruit player with physical strength and more for player
with skills, aggressively recruiting big-name players from both within Japan and
overseas. In 2003, six foreign players joined the team, and made a significant
contribution. In particular, the Fijian winger Vilimoni Delasau was number two on the
Top League try ranking list with 10 touchdowns, making him invaluable to the team.
There are also Japanese players in the team on fixed-term contracts as professionals. In
2002, Japanese representative halfback Wataru Murata joined Yamaha as a professional.
In doing so, he became the first Japanese professional at Yamaha. Murata was a
semi-professional shakaijin player (see Table 2.1) for Toshiba from 1990 to 99, and then
left to take up a professional contract at Aviron Bayonne in France from 1999 to 2001.
Murata, on his personal website, explains how he wishes to play wherever he can put
his skills to the best use, and to train in an environment that will allow him to develop'i'.
This led him to seek a professional contract upon his return to Japan. He is now
considered to be a role model for young Japanese players hoping to gain professional
contracts; indeed, four Japanese players (see below) at Yamaha have since followed in
his footsteps.
75 http://www.wata888 .net; http://justice.i-mediatv.co.jp/muratalprofile.html.
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Under its results-focused professional orientation, Yamaha is aiming for the very top of
Japanese rugby. Despite coming third in the 2003 Top League and fourth in the
Microsoft Cup, the club went through a rebuilding phase, with 20 players released".
The nature of the 'release' and the direction taken afterwards depends on the individual
players. Yamaha's shakaijin players had the option of returning to the parent company,
an effective early retirement from the game, or leaving to seek employment with
another club. Professional players (at the time only foreigners) had no such option -
they had to look elsewhere for employment of any sort. This is part of the dilemma
facing young Japanese players considering taking up a professional contract - whether
or not they sacrifice their future employment stability in the name of short-term
professional rugby opportunities (see Section 2.3).
This radical restructuring was aimed at making a great leap towards becoming a much
stronger club. To succeed in such a fiercely competitive competition, the 40-member
squad for the 2004 season included 14 new recruits. Changes were made across the
board, with every position coming under scrutiny. And even more significantly, of the
40-member squad, 11 players (six foreigners and five Japanese) are professionals
contracted to the Yamaha club, and 29 are semi-professional shakaijin. It must be noted
that contract terms vary significantly between the three employment classes. The
foreign players (all professionals) are on ¥30,000,000 per year or more ($NZ400,000),
the Japanese professionals receive between ¥1O,000,000 and ¥12,000,000 ($NZ133,000
to $160,000), and the shakaijin players ¥6,000,000 and ¥S,OOO,OOO yen ($NZSO,OOO to
76 http://www.sanspo.com/rugby/top/re200403/rg2004032502.html.
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$106,000) (interview with Yamaha team manager, 30 November 2004).
The lineup of new recruits is impressive. To introduce new energy to the team, All
Black legend Grant Batty was signed as the team's professional coach, and local and
overseas stars including New Zealander Leon McDonald (ex-All Black and Canterbury
Crusader), Nathan Williams (ex-Australian A and Queensland Red), prop Ryo
Yamamura from Kanto Gakuin " and first-five Tatsuhiko Otao from Waseda University
took up lucrative contracts. In signing such high-profile players to professional
contracts (both Japanese and foreign), Yamaha is demonstrating their intention to
become a 'professional rugby organisation' and aim for the summit of the Top League
(Yamaha RFC, 2004).
To improve the development of young players, Yamaha recently also set up its 'New
Zealand rugby experience programme'. Players spend five months in New Zealand, are
provided with language training, and have a homestay arranged for them. The
programme's main purpose is to encourage and provide ways for young Japanese
players to gain top-level experience and knowledge in New Zealand and ultimately to
improve their mental and physical approach to the game. The club is hoping that this
investment in its players will inspire them to reach a new level, bringing huge benefits
to the team in the long term.
The Yamaha club is strongly linked with North Harbour Provincial Union and Yamaha's
sister club Silverdale (in the North Harbour area) helps young players join the union's
77 Kanto Gakuin was the previous year's university championship finalists, and Yamamura, one of their
star players, was also the only student selected for the 2003 World Cup team.
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training scheme, and playa few matches with the North Harbour development
Yamaha also supports elite Japanese players experiencing top-class rugby (at the NPC
or Super 12 levels) in New Zealand. In fact, Youhei Shinomiya (wing) and Hajime Kiso
(lock) have used opportunities provided by Yamaha to take part in NPC rugby trials for
several seasons. In 2003, Shinomiya played for NPC Division Two Mid-Canterbury and
KiS078 was selected for NPC Division One North Harbour (New Zealand Herald Online,
2004)79.
On two levels this forms a stark contrast to the case of my father in 1969. The attitudes
of company officials with regard to players who desire to play for overseas clubs have
dramatically changed. While the company club maintains their labour relations of
control over players' status, contract and mobility, they now actively encourage their
players to gain experience overseas. This stands in direct contrast to my father's
situation, where he was a 'first case' for Japanese rugby. In his day, full-time work
commitment was essential, and if the company did not allow him to take time off to
play rugby, he had no other choice but to remain in Japan (see Chapter One). On the
institutional level, in the 1960s there were no regulations over players' mobility.
However, as my father's example highlights, Japanese players, who were at the time all
shakaijin, could not move overseas without their company's acceptance. If they did so,
they would lose their jobs. Furthermore, there was no support system established for
78 Kiso had to return to Japan (in August 2004) without appearing in the NPC. Under IRB and JRFU
regulations, a player fundamentally cannot be affiliated to two teams at the same time (excepting, of
course, for higher representative teams in the same country). As he was signed to Yamaha and registered
in Japan, he could not appear in both the NPC and Top League tournaments. That meant that Kiso had to
choose between quitting his Yamaha club or returning home to play in the Top League. These new, much
stricter, eligibility regulations were introduced since the start of the professional era in rugby in 1995.
79 'Japanese loosie delights fans back home' by Chris Rattue 21 July 2004.
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them should they choose to move. However, especially since the introduction of
professionalism in 1995, global rugby migration rules have been tightened significantly,
as evidenced by the case of Hajime Kiso. Thus, while the company teams may
encourage their players to travel, on the institutional level, the rule preventing affiliation
to two teams at once works against migration such as experienced by my father.
Returning to the case of the Yamaha club, the first foreign players contracted to the
Yamaha club were two New Zealanders in 1994, Stephen Lancaster and David Atkins.
From then until the 2003 season 15 foreign players have played for Yamaha. In 1994,
the team was in the B league (Division Two) of the Kansai Company League. In order
to lift the team's performances to the A league standard, the club began to actively
recruit foreign players. In 1996, Lancaster and Atkins were replaced by four foreigners;
Tongan William Lose, and three New Zealanders, Kevin Schuler, Rees Ellison and
Norman Broughton. And just as significantly, the basis of employment of the foreign
players changed.
Initially, they were employed as suketto (players filling a narrow role only with no
influence over the broader team strategy, see Section 3.1) to increase the team's strength.
However, Schuler, and later ex-New Zealand sevens player Scott Pierce in 1999, were
ernployed'" as much as teachers as players, passing on coaching methods, playing
styles and a more professional attitude. That is to say, as role models, Schuler and Pierce
fitted the oyatoi gaikokujin model of foreign player (see Section 3.1). From 1996 until
80 The players' contracts themselves did not reflect the distinction between the two roles, instead only
specifying salary and benefits. However, the players' likely roles were implicit, and had been discussed
before signing.
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2003, nine foreign players'" were recmited by Yamaha. Five were Fijian representatives
and two were former All Blacks, an indication of the higher 'class' of foreign player
Yamaha looked to recruit, In 1997, in the promotion-relegation game against Mitsubishi
Motors Kyoto, Yamaha won 47-0, and with it, promotion to the A league.
Especially after the start of the Top League in 2003, many players who had made their
name at the top level of rugby in New Zealand and played in the Rugby World Cup for
New Zealand and Fiji joined Yamaha. The New Zealanders especially were contracted
with the expectations from club management of them being players and educators at the
same time, teaching the Japanese players not only strategies and tactics, but also the
attitude needed to be a true professional (JSports, 2004). In a team aiming to become
fully professional, these foreign players have not only motivated the local players, but
also influenced the coaches and front office management. The foreign players are
spreading the ideas of winning rugby, and in doing so, they are proving to be good role
models for the Japanese players.
The following three sections develop the theme of relations between Japanese and
foreign players through case studies of three influential individuals; New Zealander
Kevin Schuler in Section 4.3, a representative Fijian migrant player in Section 4.4, and
a star Japanese player in Section 4.5.
81 They were: former Fiji international, Waisaki Sotutu in 1998; Pierce in 1999; ex-All Black and
Canterbury Crusader, Steve Surridge in 2000; ex-All Black and Fijian international, Tabai Matson and
Canterbury development player Tim Henshow in 2001; and Fiji representatives Alifereti Doviverata in
2002 and Kolino Sewabu, Norman Liairi and Vilimoni Delasau in 2003.
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4.3 Kevin Schuler - Cultural and Technical Leader
Kevin Schuler is a former New Zealand Colt, New Zealand Development, New Zealand
Divisional, and North Harbour captain, and first won All Black honours in 1989. He
was a reserve for the home Tests in 1990 and then, two years later, as an All Blacks
loose forward, was noted for his rock-solid defensive qualities (Howitt and Haworth,
2002:43). In 1992, his plan was to go overseas for a couple years, refresh, and then
come back and have another go at making the All Blacks. His initial motive for coming
to Japan was quite simple. He wanted to go to a different country, one in which he had
never played rugby.
He said, "I had never considered Japan because Kiwi rugby players were moving to
Italy and France to secure job opportunity and rugby careers at that time. Japan was
not the popular place where everyone wanted to be" (interview with Kevin Schuler, 18
June 2002). Schuler82 was the one of the first All Black players to be given clearance/"
by the NZRU to play in Japan. His rugby career in Japan has been unique, in that he has
played both as an amateur and as a professional. This gives him a highly valuable
breadth of perspective on the changes affecting Japanese rugby.
In 1992, Schuler took up a three-year contract as a foreign player at Nisshin Steel,
centered in an industrial town in Hiroshima prefecture in central Japan. He was an
employee of the Nisshin Steel under an amateur shakaijin contract. He did some
82 As explained in Chapter Three, in this thesis I have generally avoided naming the players to maintain
their privacy. However, in certain cases, the respondents can be easily identified from the nature of their
replies, and hence can be named; Kevin Schuler is one of these players.
83 During the 1992-93 New Zealand summer, 208 players (including Schuler) were given clearance by
the NZRFU to play overseas. This exodus of players and coaches encouraged journalists to comment that
Japan, Italy, France and South Africa offer economic prospects outweighing any advantages for players or
coaches (Obel, 2001 :155).
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promotional and office work for the company, and notes, "I was working in the
international division as a translator, because Nisshin exported materials overseas"
(interview with Kevin Schuler, 18 June 2002). He and his wife Michelle had some
difficulties in settling down. As that time, there were not many foreigners living there
and he sometimes felt unwelcome as a foreigner, as Japanese people pointed to them,
saying 'gaijin' (see Section 3.1). Schuler tried his best to integrate into the Japanese
employee's life styles, learning Japanese and living alongside other employees in the
company's apartments.
However, despite having some office duties, his main responsibility was as a rugby
player. Schuler was employed because of his rugby status and the high recognition of
the All Blacks in Japan. He mentioned, "One of the reasons Nisshin picked me was to
lift up their team in the Kyushu Company league and to stimulate Japanese players to
get encouragement and confidence" (interview with Kevin Schuler, 18 June 2002). As
the foreign star, he introduced basic skills and All Black training techniques, and
planned tactics for the team. However, after three years at the Nisshin club, the parent
company was struggling amid Japan's economic recession, and the survival of the rugby
club itself was under a cloud.
He explained that
A Japanese company team could only succeed if the parent company made a
large profit. Otherwise, there is no budget to maintain its rugby club, and the
club has to be disbanded. But even under such tough circumstances, the
Nisshin players of the time rallied around, pursuing both regular work and
rugby, training incredibly hard to try and win the Kyushu Company League
(interview with Kevin Schuler, 18 June 2002).
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Schuler wanted to stay at Nisshin, but ultimately, the company would not offer him a
new contract. After the introduction of professional rugby in 1996, Schuler moved to
play for the Yamaha club, as a professional player-coach. The Yamaha club has a short
history, and brought him in to help the team win promotion to the Kansai A League
championship, with the goal to further progress to become one of Japan's elite teams.
With Schuler's knowledge of Japanese rugby and his ability to communicate with
Japanese players, the Yamaha team hoped to introduce a different type of game from the
way the team had been playing in the previous few years. When Schuler came to
Yamaha, the way the players were thinking and playing was that it did not matter
whether they won or lost, as long as they showed their best and pleased the company
officials. Schuler sometimes felt that the players did not have confidence in their own
abilities or the intensity or aggressiveness required to win.
Schuler and his teammate Scott Pierce introduced various training 'menus' and routines,
such as new skill drills, various weights and dynamic sessions, and fitness training from
New Zealand. He said,
The Yamaha team has changed the traditional training, repetitive
exercise and typical daily hard training. I showed them new drills of a
shorter duration to focus on particular skills and game plans. It was
hard for the players to adapt to new concepts, but they were gradually
adopted into their game (interview with Kevin Schuler, 18 June 2002).
Schuler was impressed: "Japanese players are bigger, fitter and stronger than they used
to be, as they have been doing weight programmes for years. They now take it very
seriously. Their fitness training and gym strength work appealed to me, as they had the
potential to reach a professional level" (interview with Kevin Schuler, 18 June 2002). In
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fact, the team has noticeably developed year-by-year, and Schuler believed that the team
had a good chance to compete at the top level of the Japanese company competition by
the 2002 season.
In 2002, at the time of our interview, he was head coach for Yamaha. Schuler explained
that he was comfortable in his new role, as he had already been a player-coach. He had
also established a special relationship with his players. Schuler said that he promoted
communication with them as a key component of getting the players to know one
another. It was an idea that came to him through his experiences in Japanese rugby. He
added:
In many cases, players in Japan are over-managed by their coach,
which makes the transmission of ideas a one-way flow, in which it is
hard for people to understand each other. Respecting and
understanding each other's ideas strengthens the team. Without holding
back from addressing the hard issues, the players positively discuss
what they have to say, be they Japanese or foreign. Meeting each other
halfway and having fun together off the pitch is the source of the
Yamaha team's unity, and contributes to further improving teamwork
(interview with Kevin Schuler, 18 June 2002).
Schuler noticed an amazing transformation in the team culture from 2002 to 2003. The
whole team environment became accommodating, welcoming and supportive, with
everyone thinking of the team's welfare and success. He was proud to be able to be part
of the development of this culture. For the 2002 season, Schuler put forward 'becoming
a team' and 'becoming the best' as the team's aims.
The team manager spoke to me about the reason why Schuler was hired by Yamaha.
Kevin has a clear vision of how the team will become stronger, and to
that end what training is needed. He is fluent in Japanese, and also
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has strong morals. This is because he has goals and works to achieve
them. He states his opinion frankly, but also carefully listens to the
team's opinion (interview with team manager, Yamaha RFC, 18 June
2002).
The culture and unity in the team proved successful and it was something to be
maintained. Schuler served the team successfully for five years as a player and coach.
He believed that the contribution to the development of the special culture was crucial
to the team's victory in the Kansai A league.
4.4 'Fijian Player' -A Representative Migrant Player
In contrast to the case of Schuler, the recent Fijian migrant players in the Yamaha club
had different objectives and motivations for coming to Japan. 'Fijian player #384, joined
Yamaha in the 2003 season. In his first season with Yamaha, he was number two on the
Top League try-scoring table, with ten touchdowns. He is a Fijian national l5-a-side
representative, and national seven-a-side rugby star. According to team manager of
Yamaha, player #3 possesses terrific acceleration and has a stunning sidestep that leaves
his opponents grasping at shadows. He has also the leg power to break tacklesf
Player #3 exemplifies the typical professional migrant rugby player'", In 2000, he took
up a three-year contract at Stade Montois in France, and after that expired, came to
Yamaha because of his personal relationship with JR. JR had previously worked as a
(volunteer) physiotherapist for the Fijian representative and Sevens teams, and had
84 I interviewed him in the indoor training room of the Yamaha Motors Club on 22 January 2004.
85 Special programme about Yamaha RFC, featuring its Fijian players, on Rugby Planet, JSpors, 18
December 2003.
86 Player #3 is a 'typical migrant player' in that he is a professional on a fixed-term contract, and that his
primary motivations are money and social mobility.
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looked after player #3 when he was injured. According to player #3, the Yamaha team is
more professional in its approach to him than Stade Montois.
He felt that he was quite harshly treated in France, despite being contracted
professionally. In particular, interpersonal relations with the club officials were a
'concrete jungle'. He found them difficult and unsupportive when he had been troubled
by injury. Even so, the pay in France was good, and he explained that he would have
stayed there for another year, but the club did not want to re-sign him. Player #3 was
thankful to obtain a professional contract with the Yamaha club, and Yamaha has been
very good to him, looking after him with much greater care than Stade Montois during
his breaks with injury.
There are currently six foreign players in the Yamaha team in the 2003 season,
including five Fijian players. Fijian players mostly come to Japan in search of playing
opportunities and money. Player #3 commented,
Fijian rugby does not have the clear structural organisation that
Japanese rugby has. Professional players or company teams do not
exist. Nothing is done as a group. I am very satisfied to be playing as a
professional at a highly organised Japanese company team like
Yamaha. So that I will not disappoint anyone, I am pouring 100% ofmy
energy, passion and power into the team (interview with player #3, 22
January 2004).
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His impression of Japanese rugby, in contrast to the overseas styles he had had much
more contact with, was of a style that featured speed and expansive team play. To player
#3, this makes for an attractive game, one that makes playing in such a team fun. About
Fijian players moving to Japan, he opined that
More and more (Fijian) players will be looking forward to coming to
Japan. There are many talented young players in Fiji without the chance to
shine. However, Fiji unfortunately does not have the rugby environment to
satisfy them. If I can, I want to help them realise their ambitions (interview
with player #3,22 January 2004).
About the influence of foreign (particularly Fijian) players on Japanese rugby, he
believes that without doubt, the quality of the game and level of the Japanese players
has improved,
I think that adding us foreign players to that mix makes Japanese
rugby more exciting and thrilling. In the future, if more overseas
players come, especially from the northern hemisphere, there will be
an even greater variety of styles, and they will bring even more
experience and knowledge of advanced rugby" (interview with
player #3,22 January 2004).
Despite the positive words from players like Player #3, there is a difference in the
treatment of and relations with Fijian and New Zealand players. Fijian players are
significantly cheaper to contract than the star New Zealand players the company clubs
are now recruiting, and can be seen as a form of 'cheap labour' (see Section 3.6). That
the Fijians are still happy with their treatment at Yamaha may be a function of them
having lower expectations than New Zealand players. Their lower salaries have allowed
Yamaha to hire more Fijians for their money - hence the five Fijian players joining in
2003. This is a form of division of labour, in which Fijians are hired to do a narrow job
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for lower salaries, compared to the New Zealanders, who are on significantly higher
salaries and who are also expected to teach and lead, as well as play. Thus, it could be
considered that the Fijians are suketto, compared to the oyatoi gaikokujin New
Zealanders.
4.5 'Japanese Player' - The Local Perspective
The influence of foreign players in the Yamaha club has had an impact on the
development and changes in attitude of local players over time. The case of a local star
player is a representative example. Player #487 is employed as a shakaijin player, and
has been playing for the Yamaha club for four years. He made his international debut
while at university in 1999, and has already become a key player for the full and sevens
Japanese national teams. He told me in an interview that
The team environment at Yamaha on and off the rugby field has no
age-based hierarchical [sempai-kohai] relations, instead featuring strong
horizontal bonds between foreign and local players. The Yamaha team is a
'melting pot', because we have different kinds of players from different
backgrounds all gathering together (interview with player #4, 22 January
2004).
Without holding back from addressing the hard issues, the players positively discuss
what they have to say, be they Japanese or foreign. Meeting each other halfway and
having fun together off the pitch is the source of the Yamaha team's unity, and
contributes to improve the teamwork according to Murakami (2004)88.
87 I interviewed him in the indoor training room of the Yamaha Motors Club on 22 January 2004.
88 The Top League Team Profile: Yamaha Motors on JSPORTS, October 2004. In this programme, Mr.
Murakami conducted interviews with team manager, coach, Japanese players and foreign players in the
Yamaha Club.
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Player #4 sees both good and bad points in the foreign influx. On the positive side, he
has learnt much from the foreign players during his rugby career, and describes the role
of foreign players in the following manner:
The major role of the foreign players at Yamaha has been to show the
Japanese what it means to be a professional rugby player. Seen from
overseas, Japanese company rugby can be said to have some of the
features of a professional team. However, from our point of view as
Japanese players, the awareness of being a professional is weak. The
foreign players see that as step one in rugby. They are aware of being
professionals and fulfill their responsibilities. They really do provide us
Japanese with an excellent stimulus for action (interview with player #4,
22 January 2004).
Player #4's statement that 'the awareness of being a professional is weak' means that the
attitude fundamental to being a professional is not strongly ingrained in the players and
staff at Yamaha. That is to say, the single-minded devotion to winning and the
dedication of every waking moment to being a better player and team member that is
characteristic of true professionals (as defined by New Zealand players, and as the
Yamaha club aspires to become) has yet to take root. Being a professional means having
a responsibility to the team, its owner and supporters to not betray the trust they have
placed in you. This requires a high degree of focus on rugby that is arguably lacking
from shakaijin teams, whose players have other work responsibilities besides rugby. As
Yamaha tries to become a more professional organisation, it is the instilment of the
professional mindset into every member of the organisation that has been the major role
of the foreign players in player #4's opinion.
However, player #4 also commented about the negative impact of foreign players on the
team. He believes that
The influence offoreign rugby in Japan has been huge, and has lifted the
domestic performance level dramatically. Foreign players certainly are
top-notch players, strong and fulfill their role on the field in every way.
However, Yamaha is still not getting the best out of its foreign players. In
tight spots, it relies only on the foreigners, which shows the team's
inexperience. For example, our team has player #3, whose strength is
scoring tries. But he cannot do things alone - we need to build a team
that can more reliably create situations where he can score for us
(interview with player #4,22 January 2004).
This quote shows that there is still some way to go before achieving a balanced role for
foreign players in the team. In particular, if the team always turns to its foreigners in
difficult situations, this indicates a likely fundamental lack of confidence among the
Japanese players in their own ability. A professional player is expected to take the
initiative and the responsibility to do what is needed to win. Also, relying on foreign
players in such a way hinders the development of Japanese players. It is only through
exposure to tough rugby that players learn to face all the challenges the game has; by
'cushioning' the Japanese players, the foreign players are in effect holding them back.
On balance, player #4 emphasised that the team should select foreign players who fit
into the desired team style and tactics, rather than building a team to fit the foreign
players. He questioned whether the latter approach was better for team growth and for
providing opportunities for young Japanese players. This is a crucial criticism, because
even now, the Yamaha team relies on foreign imports to improve Japanese players'
skills and techniques, and hence to sustain itself in the elite Top League competition.
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This is a dilemma that company clubs face; how to reconcile the need for quality
foreign players to help the team in the short term, which can conflict with the team also
needing to cultivate and provide opportunities for young local players for long term
performance improvement. For example, a situation may develop where a team has an
expensive foreign star and an up-and-coming young player (who has perhaps developed
to first-team standard faster than expected) vying for one position. In such a situation,
difficult choices must be made about who has priority of selection, and Yamaha's policy
in this respect is not yet clear.
What is clear is that they are actively encouraging the growth of young Japanese players.
However, the team has yet to establish a comprehensive academy system to enable
young local players to gain experience and develop from a young age under the wing of
the Yamaha club. Although the team manager expressed to me his hope that one will be
established, there are no firm plans for one yet. The club's recruitment methods, of high
school and university students, are still much as they were in the shakaijin era. Thus,
while the club aims to become a self-sufficient and fully professional rugby organisation,
there is clearly a long way still to go.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, I have followed three broad themes. The first was the history of how the
Yamaha company team has come to play and organise itself with a new emphasis on
full-time professional players and managers. The transformation from amateur shakaijin
company rugby teams to the professional-style organisations in the Top League has led
to significant changes in the structure of games, company club management and player
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labour relations. The Yamaha club, with its young history, is a relevant case study in
examining how company rugby has been restructured to create a competitive team,
work towards a higher quality of game, establish their own club image and sustain Top
League status.
The second theme was that of labour relations, in how the club relates to recruits and its
players. Player labour relations have changed from amateur shakaijin through
semi-professional shakaijin to a more professional form, and foreign players have had a
strong influence in this progression. In my research, I have focused on the professional
style of club management and the shifting of labour relations with players in the
Yamaha club. This key move toward professionalism has enabled the club officials to
exert more control over players' status, contracts and daily training routine. This is
especially the case for professional players, which includes all the foreign players, and
since 2002, Japanese players. There are now five local professionals in the Yamaha
squad, who have given up the security of a guaranteed job after rugby in return for
full-time professional contracts.
This led into the third theme, the question of equality between foreign and Japanese
players, in terms of salary, social status and the expectations on them. This was explored
through three case studies, of New Zealander Kevin Schuler, a representative Fijian
player, and a Japanese star player. Company rugby has been significantly improved by
the presence of migrant players on the field, and no doubt the local players have learned
from them. More importantly, the influence of New Zealand and Fijian players have
enabled Japanese players not only to gain new strategies and tactics, but also to learn the
attitude and sense of responsibility expected of full-time professionals. This has helped
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to change the club culture from a traditional shakaijin style, featuring hierarchical
sempai-kiihai relations, to that of a balanced and open environment, where the players
work together and contribute regardless of age and ethnicity.
Since 1994, the Yamaha club has also relied on imported talent to lift the team's
competitiveness and its public profile. The foreign players in the team have been
employed to fulfill varying roles, but can be broadly divided into the categories of
suketto (helpers) or oyatoi gaikokujin (employed foreigners), who tend to be teachers
and mentors. Kevin Schuler, in his role as player-coach at Yamaha, was an example of
an oyatoi gaikokujin, as are the star foreigners now being recruited. Foreign players
before 1996 and the Fijian players, employed at lower salaries than the New Zealanders
to fulfill a narrower role, can be classed as suketto. The motivation and depth of
commitment of the foreign players can be thought of as varying depending on the role
they are employed to play, which perhaps weakens the sense of an environment with all
players working equally hard together for common goals.
While it appears that foreign players of both categories have contributed to the
improved performance of the Yamaha club, there are some negative aspects to foreign
players' presence in the team. Some foreign players have kept promising young
Japanese players out of the Top League team. This is the dilemma that the company
club faces; as the company club needs to win to ensure they retain their status in the Top
League, at the same time, the JRFU wants the teams to develop quality Japanese players
for the national team. Since the establishment of the Yamaha club, 'champion of the Top
League' and 'the best professional rugby club in the world' have been their goals, but
much work remains to be done. In the next chapter, I will look at the Japanese national
97
team. The influx of foreign-born players into the company leagues have also had major
effects on the performance of the national team over the last ten years. This provides
another interesting case study of the influence of foreign-born players in Japanese
rugby.
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Chapter Five: Foreign-born players in the Japanese national team
5.0 Introduction
In this chapter, I will trace and analyse the entry and emergence of foreign-born players
in the Japanese national team. The entry of foreign-born players into the company
leagues has had a major effect on the performance of the Japanese national team. From
1985, the JRFU began selecting foreign-born players to create a competitive national
side and increase the popularity of the game relative to other sports. A total of 32
foreign-born players (see appendix page 139) have represented Japan to date. This
discussion pays attention to eligibility criteria in both the amateur and professional
periods and considers the debate about the involvement of foreign-born players in the
Japanese national team.
selection
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This chapter also outlines the changes in role that have occurred since
of foreign-born players, with particular emphasis on the pel~·tO]l·m'H1S:Y
team and the attitudes of Japanese players. The main focus of
comparative case studies of the national team; 'Ohnishi
'Hirao Japan' in 1999 (Section 5.5) and 'Mukai Japan' in
the chapter highlights the increasing tension between the JRFU and its continued
strategy of selecting foreign-born players to the national team, while at the same time
requiring the company league teams, which provide the professional player contracts, to
limit their recruitment of foreign-born players as a means to protect and encourage local
Japanese player development. However, despite the JRFU's foreign-born player
selection strategy and its desire to produce a competitive national team, a driving
concern for the national team coaches and many commentators has been the ability of
the Japanese national team to show a 'Japanese style' on the field.
5.1 Eligibility to represent the Japanese national team
Chiba, Ebihara and Morino (2001:211) discuss how Japanese sporting institutions
determine who is and is not eligible to represent Japan in national sports teams. In most
sports events, such as in the Olympic Games and the soccer World Cup, eligibility to
compete is mainly regulated by nationality'". In such cases as the Japanese Olympic
team and the national soccer team, foreign-born players cannot play for a country where
they do not hold nationality, and must naturalise'". However, for the Rugby World Cup,
the IRB has deliberately kept national eligibility rules rather vague. Obel (2001: 188)
89 The national eligibility rules in the major (international) sporting events!competitions state that persons
will not be permitted dual representation. Accordingly, any player who is qualified to play for more than
one nation will be deemed to have committed him/herself to one nation only when they have fulfilled the
requirements of that nation for participation at a national level in this sport (Chiba, Ebihara and Morino,
2001:211).
90 There have been cases where institutional naturalisation has occurred in the Japanese sporting world.
Brazilian soccer stars, Ruy Ramos, Wagner Augusto and Alessandro Santos were helped to naturalise and
then selected for the Japanese national soccer team during the 1990s. In 2003, newly naturalised
Brazilian-born Tanaka Marcus Tullio played in the Japanese Olympic (under-23) soccer team's qualifying
campaign and (ultimately unsuccessful) finals appearance. A Brazilian, Marcos Sugiyama, became the
first naturalised player in the national volleyball team. Michael Takahashi was selected for the Japanese
basketball team. He was considered a 'half breed' because he was born to a Japanese mother and an
American father. Six of the 23 players in the Nagano Winter Olympic ice-hockey side were Canadians of
Japanese descent. They were controlled by institutional rules and regulations (Chiba, Ebihara and Morino,
2001:211-13).
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notes that prior to 1996 and the introduction of professionalism, players faced limited
restriction on their domestic and international movement. A player could represent one
country in one year and elect to play for another country the following year so long as
he fulfilled the national eligibility criteria. However, in 1997, the IRB changed the
eligibility rules (Regulation 7.1) so that a player can play for a country if he meets one
of three criteria'", In doing so, the IRB sought to halt the flow of foreign-born players in
order to ensure and protect the integrity of their international tournament, the World
Cup. However, a foreign-born player with three years' experience in Japan can (in most
cases) become eligible to play for Japan. New Zealand players like Robert Gordon,
Jamie Joseph and Graeme Bachop, after representing New Zealand in the 1995 RWC,
were therefore not prevented by Regulation 7.1 from representing Japan in the 1999
RWC.
However, from 1999, the IRB again tightened the rules (Obel, 2001:190). Now, once a
player has played for one country he is deemed to be (in rugby terms) a national of that
country, and cannot play for another country in his lifetime. This regulation overrides
residency and/or citizenship eligibility criteria. However, players who have not
represented the country of their origin, such as New Zealand migrant players are still
eligible to play for the likes of Japan after satisfying the applicable eligibility criteria of
their new country of residence.
91 A player could represent one country in one year and elect to play for another country the following
year so long as he fulfilled the national eligibility criteria. According to IRB Regulation 7.1, a player can
play for a country in the RWC if he meets one of these conditions: '(a) he was born (there); or (b) one
parent or grandparent was born (there); or (c) he has completed thirty-six consecutive months of residence
immediately preceding the time of playing' (Chiba, Ebihara and Morino, 2001 :211).
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The JRFU Board laid out its policy regarding eligibility criteria for foreign-born players
in its 2003 Year Book, deciding that, in order to be eligible for selection for the Japanese
national team, a player must fulfil all of the following three criteria:
1. be eligible under IRB regulations
2. be employed by a company team according to that company's formal rules
3. have been resident in Japan for three years
The requirement for only three years of residency makes it easier for foreign-born rugby
players to gain selection to the Japanese national rugby team than to any other national
team (Kobayashi, 1998:44). There is no obligation to obtain citizenship or naturalisation
as in other competitive sports in Japan. The JRFU introduced the eligibility rules for
foreign-born players in company clubs and the Japanese national team in 1992, when
the game was still regulated according to amateur regulations, and the rules have not
been changed since 1992. As noted earlier, these regulations stipulated that the company
teams were limited to two players per company team on the field. By contrast, there
were essentially no restrictions at the national level regarding the national eligibility for
foreign-born players. Most of the foreign-born players were selected for the Japanese
national team because they met the above criteria, rather than by naturalisation. As a
result, players like Bruce Ferguson (Fiji), Ian Williams (Australia) and Tupo Faamasino
(Samoa) were able to represent Japan after having played in Japan for three years.
The selection of foreign-born players to the Japanese national team has provoked debate
both within Japan and within the broader Asian rugby community. The eligibility rules
regarding foreign-born players have raised problems regarding consistency between the
102
company leagues and the national team. There is no restriction on the number of
foreign-born players in the Japanese national team, while there is a limit of two on the
field per company club. Rugby historian Shinrokuro Kobayashi (1998:48) argues that
the JRFU should introduce clear selection criteria through fair competition, where the
balance must be kept between 'homegrown' and foreign-born talents. He criticises
what he views as a shortsighted strategy of strengthening the national team by using
foreign-born players at the expense of developing young domestic players. Yet, on the
other hand, the success of the Japanese national team is vital for the development of
young Japanese players, and the national team has been strengthened by the inclusion of
foreign-born players. Thus, the JRFU's eligibility rules have caused a major dilemma.
The JRFU's foreign-born player eligibility regulations and selection strategies also
cause controversy in international tournaments. While the IRB's rules concerning
national eligibility limit the presence of foreign-born players in national teams
participating in the RWC, eligibility rules for other international tournaments have
included stricter criteria. For example, in the 1996 Asian Tournament, foreign-born
players were banned, and a wholly 'homegrown' Japanese team was victonous/".
However, more significantly, recently the Korean RFU has proposed a plan under which,
from the 2006 Asian tournament, a player's eligibility would not be based on IRB-RWC
regulations, but rather on citizenship. The Asian RFU Board Committee is now
considering this proposal'", Koichi Murakami argues that the exclusion of foreign-born
nationals was imposed in 'fairness' to other Asian national teams, as the Asian
92 In the 1998 and 2002 Asian Tournament, the Japanese national team lost both tournament finals to
Korea.
93 http://www.old.rugby-japan.jp/information/2004/040529_asia.html.
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Tournament is to enable Asian national teams to compete against each other (interview
with Murakami, 20 June 2002). From this viewpoint, the high number of foreign-born
players in the Japanese national team hinders the development of rugby union in Asian
countries. Thus, the JRFU's residency-based regulations continue to cause controversy
both within Japanese rugby circles and in international fora. But the controversy does
not stop at eligibility - the role and influence of foreign-born players has also been
much-discussed.
5.2 History offoreign-born players in the national team
The influx of foreign-born players has had a significant role on the development and the
strength of the Japanese national team. The first case of capped foreign-born players to
represent Japan was the selections of Hopoi Taione (Daito Bunka University) and his
teammate Nohomuli Taumoefolau for Japan, against France in 1986. In the same year,
Hopoi was replaced by Sinali Latu who played a key role for the Japanese national team
until the 1987 RWC. These powerful Tongans formed the backbone of the Japanese
national team's effort to show physical strength on the world stage, and they were well
accepted by the Japanese rugby public. Speaking the language and taking on the local
customs'", they were regarded as having successfully fitted into the culture of Japanese
rugby and society at large (Suzuki, 1987:40). Their integration was successful to the
point that they were not regarded as merely suketto, but instead as 'Japanese born in
Tonga and more Japanese than the Japanese' (Ohtomo, 1998:36).
94 For example, these Tongan players were willing to fit into the hierarchical social structure prevalent in
Japanese rugby circles, accepting their place in the hierarchy (Suzuki, 1987:40). This was helped by many
of them having attended university in Japan (see Section 3.2), in doing so becoming attuned to the norms
of Japanese society.
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Participation in the RWC and more international matches has increased the pressure on
the JRFU to change their selection criteria for the national team to focus more on the
size and power of players. At the inaugural World Cup in 1987, Japan, playing a
contact-oriented game'", was overwhelmed by the physically much larger and stronger
foreign opponents. As foreign commentators have pointed out (Tucker, 2003:51), the
major problem for the team was (and is still) the lack of size and weight of Japanese
players, with their consequent inability to dominate at the lineout and serums. In order
to catch up with the standard of world rugby and to be competitive at the RWC, the
JRFU began emphasising the rapid development of a strong forward pack, selecting
foreign-born players to this end (Ohtomo, 1998:37).
The strategy was to select foreign-born players as pillars of strength, and to encourage
Japanese players to improve their skills, technique, knowledge and international
competitiveness around them. In the 1990, lock Ekeroma Luaiufi (New Zealand) (Niko
Niko Do) played in the 1991 World Cup qualifying rounds and the Cup finals, arguably
making an invaluable contribution to organising the forward unit. He was followed by
many more foreign forwards'", as the JFRU sought to increase the power and impact of
the forwards and to compete at lineouts and serums
95 The 1987 team's style of play was similar to that used by Seiji Hirao's team in 1999, see Section 5.5.
96 In the 1992 Asian Tournament, Sinali Latu (Sanyo) and Lopeti Oto (Daito Bunka University) and Sam
Kaleta (Ricoh) gained their first caps in the final against Hong Kong.
In the 1993 tour to Wales, five foreign-born players represented Japan. They were Tongan Sione Latu
(Daito Bunka university), Samoan Sam Kaleta (Ricoh) and ex-Samoan representative Tupo Faamasino
(Niko Niko Do), Fijian national team triallist Bruce Ferguson (Hino Motors) and ex-Wallaby Ian
Williams (Kobe Steel) (Otomo, 1998:37).
Of these eight players, only Oto and Williams (wingers) were back; the rest were brought in to strengthen
the forwards.
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At the 1997 Pacific Rim Championship (Epson CUp97), seven foreign-born players
represented Japan, of who five were forwards 98. This continued the theme of adding
foreign 'force' to the forward pack. The Japanese youngsters were forced to raise their
game to meet the challenge of the high standards of their new teammates, and definitely
gained much by playing alongside the much bigger, fitter and stronger foreign-born
players. As a result, the inclusion of foreign-born players was very much welcomed by
the JRFD. However, 1997 saw the peak of reliance on foreign-born players. In 1999,
Japan boasted six foreign-born players" in its World Cup squad (Ohtomo, 1998:38),
and in 2003, the number had fallen to four.
5.3 The debate regarding success and failure offoreign influences in the national team
Rugby commentator Koichi Murakami (2002) argued in his interview with me that the
national team does not grow stronger by relying on foreign-born players from the
company leagues. That is, what is good for the individual company team is unlikely to
be good for the national team as a whole. Japanese company clubs have tended to draw
on foreign sources to add new dimensions to company teams, such as technical skills,
coaching methods and playing styles in order to secure victory in the company
championship. Company teams and the national body (the JRFU) have different
interests, which occasionally overlap but frequently do not. This divergence of interest
97 The IRB proposed to establish the Pan Pacific Series involving Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, the United States,
Canada, Argentina, Hong Kong and Japan. A depleted Pacific Rim Championship with limited media
sponsorship began in 1996 involving only Japan, Hong Kong, the United States and Canada in one
round-robin series. Not until 1999 did the three Pacific Island nations join, while Hong Kong left the
tournament (www.irb-epson.irb.org), (Obel, 2001: 196)
98 The forwards included New Zealanders Rob Gordon (Toshiba), Greg Smith (Toyota Shokki), and Ross
Thompson (NEC), plus Fijians Isikeli Basiyalo (Toyota Motors) and Patiliai Tuidraki (Toyota Motors). In
the backs, Andrew McCormick (Toshiba) and Stephen Miln appeared for Japan. See appendix page 139
for more details.
99 The six were McCormick, Smith, Gordon and Tuidraki, and other two New Zealanders, Jamie Joseph
and Graeme Bachop.
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is highlighted in the two problems outlined below.
The foreign influence in Japanese company rugby has encouraged those in charge of the
national team to actively aim to select foreign-born players. The JRFU seeks to create a
competitive national team with growing international success, develop Japanese players
and increase the popularity of the game to compete with other professional sports
(principally baseball and soccer). However, despite this effort, the national team has
recorded many poor performances over the last ten years. The losses against key
opposition'Y' led Japan's national broadcaster, in a sports documentary show, to call the
1990s Japanese rugby's 'lost decade' (NHK, 2004)101.
In trying to build up the national team, the likes of Murakami (1992:53-5) and
Kobayashi (1994:44) have argued that the JRFU has seemingly become over-reliant on
foreign-born players and foreign methods (training or playing styles). This could be
called management by placing demand on foreign sources, with a simplistic train of
thought that 'foreign power and size is good'. In doing so, it has been argued that the
distinctive playing style of Japanese rugby at national level has been de-emphasised (see
Section 5.4), and the prospects of Japanese players to make their own national side
great!y decreased.
100 It is important to bear in mind that the JRFU (JRFU Annual Report 2003) and Japanese rugby media
(Nagata, Fujishima, Shima, Matsuse, Takagawa, Ohtomo, Tokimi and Murakami, 2003:20-7) measures
the team's success or failure against strong Western opposition, and in major global tournaments,
principally the RWC. Victories over other Asian nations, such as in World Cup qualifying, are expected
rather than celebrated.
101 This programme argued that since recording its first World Cup finals tournament victory in 1991,
Japanese rugby has failed in many respects. In particular, the game's popularity and the national team's
relative strength have declined. It posed the question: how can the Japanese national team, with players of
an inferior body size, stand up to the rest of the world? The JRFU's efforts at reforming the structure of
rugby are also called into question - it is considered questionable whether the new Top League in fact be
considered a realistic way to achieve its lofty aims (see Section 2.4).
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And judging by results in international events, this reliance has not been successful. As
expected ofit (see footnote 102), the Japanese national team has managed to qualify for
every RWC tournament since 1987. Qualification against less powerful Asian
opposition was never in serious doubt; Japan easily beat Korea (90-24) and
Chinese-Taipei (155-3) in qualifying for Rugby World Cup 2003. However, Japan has
had a difficult path to improve on their dismal record of one win in 17 RWC matches'I".
I have identified two main problems regarding the inclusion of foreign-born players in
the national team. The first is that the selection of foreign-born players may have
changed the fundamental structure of the Japanese game. Since the late 1970s, Japanese
rugby has arguably gone from a 'mono-cultural' playing style to a 'multi-cultural'
playing style with many foreign influences. This is illustrated by the case studies in
Sections 5.5 and 5.6. The mono-cultural and quite distinctively Japanese style of
Ohnishi Japan of 1968 had, through the influence of foreign-born players, transformed
into 1999's Hirao Japan, which relied on foreign-born players for on-field leadership
and had no one clear playing style.
However, it is difficult to make generalisations over time, as the impact of foreign-born
players has differed depending on the individual player, and the role desired of them by
the team management. As a result, a very complicated picture has emerged of the
harnessing of foreign-born players and their integration into the national team. This is
proving to be one of the most significant challenges for Japanese rugby.
102 Japan's record at the RWC is - 1987: Lost to USA 18-21; Lost to England 7-60; Lost to Australia
23-42. 1991: Lost to Scotland 9-47; Lost to Ireland 16-32; Beat Zimbabwe 42-8. 1995; Lost to Wales
10-57, Lost to Ireland 28-50; Lost to New Zealand 17-145. 1999; Lost to Samoa 9-43; Lost to Wales
64-15; Argentina 12-33. 2003: Lost to Scotland 11-32; Lost France 29-51; Lost to Fiji 13-41; Lostto USA
26-39.
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Maguire (1996:342) points to a similar problem in British ice success of
the Great Britain team was heavily dependent on the roles played by v.anauian migrants.
They have had a significant impact at both the club and the the
1995 World Championship tournament squad, only 15 of 23 players
origin. Additionally, British ice hockey is dominated by a Canadian ethos, coacrung
strategy, and playing style, which reinforces the lack of opportunities for British niavers
(Maguire, 1996:345-6). In this case, the 'Britishness' of the national team has
question.
The case of Japanese rugby has been quite similar, as New Zealand players and playing
styles have come to be highly influential in the company teams, and turn in the national
team. In particular, in the 1999 RWC, New Zealand players dominated key starting
positions in the Japanese national team, thereby denying Japanese players the chance to
perform on the world stage. Murakami argues that 'New Zealand rugby hegemony' has
meant that Japan's original technical skills and playing styles have disappeared,
producing a playing style emphasising physical contact, but in doing so has become
unsuited to the Japanese body size (interview with Murakami, 20 June 2002).
The second major problem has arisen from team selection and tactics. It is argued that it
has become difficult to groom Japanese players for certain positions that are dominated
by foreign-born players. This is an emerging issue in team sports, such as rugby league
and rugby union, and is termed 'stacking'. It describes a situation where athletes from
an ethnic minority dominate particular playing positions, notably those with minimal
leadership requirement. Collins (1998) argues that black rugby league players may have
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greater opportunities to rise to prominence in the game. However, they are restricted by
racial prejudice regarding the positions they occupy. According to Melnick (1996), in
New Zealand rugby union, Maori and Pacific Island players hold team positions that
conform to racially stereotyped notions about 'black players as natural athletes'. These
positions tend to be associated with the need for speed and strength.
The issue of selection of foreign-born players in the Japanese national team is once
again in the spotlight following the failure of Japan's emerging players to fill gaps
created by injury and retirement. For example, most of the No.8s and centres, positions
that require size and strength, in the national team over the last ten years have been
foreign-born players (see appendix page 139). However, the most glaring example of
the 'stacking' problem was in the selection of halfback at the 1999 RWC. This goes
beyond the framework of the stacking problem outlined above, in that halfback is one of
the key playmakers in the game, controlling the flow of play.
In 1999 former New Zealand representative, Graeme Bachop, was vying with the
Japanese player Wataru Murata 103 for the starting position. Although Murata was
selected for Japan RWC squad, he was not given the chance to be the starting halfback.
Bachop's selection over the very talented Murata sent a negative message to Japanese
players that, even in a position that suited the typically smaller Japanese body size and
one in which a Japanese player could control the game in a Japanese style of play, they
could be overlooked in favour of foreign-born players.
103 Murata made his debut for Japan in 1990, and as of August 2004 he had won 36 caps. He played for
Toshiba from 1990 to 1999, which won two Company Championship and three All Japan Championship
titles during this time. He then took up a professional contract with the French club Aviron Bayonne,
earning his return to the Japanese national team in 2001. He is now playing for the Yamaha club, and was
again selected for the 2003 RWC squad.
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The continuation of the styles of play developed in Japan is said to have been threatened
by the introduction of foreign influences and methods. The particular focus of the
remainder of this chapter is on the composition and playing style of the Japanese
national team at three different times, characterised by different selection criteria,
coaches' rugby philosophies and team building methods. The following three sections
will aim to ascertain the differences between the three cases, given the varying influence
of foreign-born players in the Japanese national team. The following are case studies of
the team in 1968, the so-called 'classic era' of the Japanese mono-cultural rugby style,
in 1999, perhaps at the peak of foreign involvement and reliance, and in 2003, where
team management was looking to rebuild a Japanese style of play with the inclusion of
foreign-born players. While foreign-born players were only included to suit specific
needs in 2003, their inclusion was still located within a framework of a diversity of
playing styles.
5.41968 All Japan (Ohnishi Japan)
'Purely Japanese' is the term often used to refer to the original and distinctive Japanese
rugby playing style, the one that made Japan known to the rugby world in the late 1960s
and the early 1970s. In 1968, Tetsunosuke Ohnishi coached the All Japan team104 on a
tour to New Zealand. He employed what has later been referred to as a distinctively
Japanese set of tactics, strategies and coaching methods. He called the overall method
'out-flanking, contact and continuity'. It emphasised speed and ball movement, and
running away from the bulky and relatively slow New Zealanders. By becoming a
benchmark style for Japanese coaches to refer to, it made a large contribution Japanese
104 In the Japanese manner of naming the team after the manager, the team was called 'Ohnishi Japan'.
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rugby's development and push for victories. The national team of the time had a strong
unitary philosophy, with the seishin spirit to the forefront. In his book Rugby Ohnishi
wrote
I would like to explain why expansion, approach and connection were
decided on as the fundamental tactics of the All Japan team. What
you must think of when comparing the Japanese and foreign teams
are the difference in physical strength. That gap is remarkable,
especially in the forwards. Therefore, on receiving the ball we should
expand quickly, avoiding a forward battle as much as possible.
Approach means playing to use Japanese skills to the utmost. Foreign
players' strengths are putting on the speed at a certain gap to the
opposition, while Japanese players' strengths are approaching the
opposition to a close distance where tricky skills come into play.
Connection means continuous play with every player following the
ball. As seen in marathon running, a small body is no barrier to great
stamina. By running faster and for longer than them, and by running
into the holes they leave, we can grab the initiative.
Employing these tactics, the 1968 All Japan team embarked on its first-ever New
Zealand tour. The highlight of the tour was a match against the Junior All Blacks,
featuring many rising stars, some of whom, such as Laurie Mains, would go on to
become NZ rugby greats lO5• The All Japan players were considered to be at a significant
disadvantage - their average height and weight was only 171.3cm and 72.2kg, against
the New Zealanders' 181.1 em and 87.5 kg l06. But, unfazed by their seemingly stronger
105 The Junior All Blacks players were (forwards): A. A. Gardiner (Taranaki), D. A. Pescini (Otago), W. C.
Japeth (Auckland), G. A. Dermody (Southland), I. Eliason (Taranaki). B. Holmes (North Auckland), I.
Turley (Wairarapa), G. J. Allen (Poverty Bay); (backs): I. N. Stevens (Wellington). J. P. Dougan (Hawks
Bay), R. Burgess (Manawatu), M. W. O'Callaghan, D. R. Panther (North Auckland), O. G. Stephens
(Wellington), L. Mains (Otago).
106 The average height and weight figures broken down into (All Japan) forwards 175cm, backs 167cm,
and forwards 75.1kg, backs 68.9kg, versus (Junior All Blacks) forwards 187.4 ern, backs 173.9 cm and
forwards 97.9 kg, backs 75.6 kg. The disparities in the forwards are particularly significant, as a
12cm-plus difference in height and over 22 kilogram difference in weight means that the Junior All
Blacks would be expected to dominate both high oriented (such as lineouts) and weight-oriented (such as
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opposition, the All Japan team beat the Junior All Blacks 23-19 in a historic victory.
Under the same management, the team enjoyed further success. In 1971, on the Rugby
Football Union's lOOth Anniversary Far East Tour, the All Japan team lost narrowly
19-27 and 3-6 to the visiting English team. These efforts made Japanese rugby known to
the world. Japanese tactics, strategies and coaching styles continued to be developed,
with expansion-approach-connection as the maxim driving Japanese rugby play
forward.
It remained the benchmark playing style and coaching technique for high school,
university and company rugby in Japan until the mid-1980s. Around that time, the
influx of foreign-born players began. Then, after the 1987 Rugby World Cup and
increasing international competition, Japanese coaches, seeing that the prevalent
international style was size- and contact-oriented rugby, began to feel that Japan had to
follow this trend as well. They began to emphasise size and power over speed and
mobility, and tapped the growing number of foreign-born players in Japanese university
and company teams to meet these goals. The increasing emphasis on size and power in
company teams also flowed through to the Japanese national team, and this approach
reached its peak in the 1999 Japanese World Cup team.
5.5 1999 Cherry Blacks (Hirao Japan)
In 1999 the Japanese national team was sometimes called the 'Cherry Blacks', because
of the five New Zealand players selected to represent Japan. The team won the Pacific
serums and mauls) plays. This would make it very difficult for the All Japan team to compete at set plays,
meaning that tactics oriented towards engaging the opposition one-on-one in open play and beating them
with agility, as well as constantly moving the ball away from the heavier (and more likely slower) New
Zealanders was more likely to be a competitive strategy.
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Rim Championship in 1999 and the Japanese mass media began to draw the public's
attention to the national team. Media commentators predicted successful results in the
1999 Rugby World Cup in Wales (Morita, 1999:3-6). With the selection of several
foreign-born players, the JRFU aimed to capture the attention of the Japanese public by
performing well, thereby rebuilding the popularity of rugby and hopefully bringing
about a revival of the game.
The national team coach Hirao's inclusion of experienced foreign-born players in key
positions helped lift and maintain team confidence. 1990 All Black Jamie Joseph
(number 8), Robert Gordon (also number 8) and former Canterbury flanker Greg Smith
powered the serum with Graeme Bachop (halfback) playing a commanding role behind
them 107. Fijian-born winger Pat Tuidraki also featured regularly. In addition, the
influence of former All Black trial list Andrew McCormick at centre had grown
markedly over the previous two seasons. Fluent in Japanese and possessing strong
leadership skills, he carried respect from all quarters as captain and as player.
In total Andrew McCormick was capped 25 times for Japan and was the national team's
first foreign captain. He told me about captaining Japan:
I found it very natural to play for the Japanese national team. It doesn't
matter what team I'm playing for. We (Kiwi players) considered
ourselves as one player in the national team, nothing else really. We're
always going to give 100% with our responsibilities. But because I'd
been in Japan for so long, I didn't want to let anyone down. I always got
a buzz when I heard the Japanese anthem played. I was honoured to be
able to be the captain, and did feel pressure sometimes. The Japanese
107 After the 1999 RWC, the IRB changed the eligibility regulations for national representation to
prohibit players with dual eligibility from representing more than one country in their career.
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players paid so much respect to me as the captain. We had a good
rapport and mutual respect. This was definitely the biggest part of my
rugby career until now, playing at the World Cup, playing for Japan and
being the captain ... huge for me. I will never forget it (interview with
Andrew McCormick, 20 June 2002).
When McCormick first joined the Japanese national team, he tried to
work on the mental attitudes of Japanese players. He instilled in them,
urged them to communicate more, to express themselves, and to make
decisions by themselves. It was not something that the collectivist,
seishin influence on Japanese rugby usually encourages. McCormick
wanted to make his players make individual decisions and to be leaders,
to make them ready for the tough competition at the World Cup.
McCormick also felt that the Japanese players did not show the
necessary aggression and strong will to win, and thus tried to develop a
confidence in their ability to win (interview with Andrew McCormick,
20 June 2002)
McCormick and other New Zealand players, hired by Japanese company teams, were
welcomed into the national team as they were not only eligible after three years in Japan,
but also fitted the coach's desired style. Hirao rated the presence of foreign-born players
highly in his interview with Murakami (1999:11-4):
They are at the core of the team's seishin (spirit), and not merely gaijin
suketto (helpers) adding skills and abilities. If we add their mental
strength to the finely turned skills of the Japanese players, we can
build a team the likes of which has not been seen in Japan before. In
summary, we are not using the Meiji-era philosophy of 'wakonyosai'
(Japanese spirit and Western technology) but 'yokonwasai' (Western
spirit and Japanese technology).
With this comment Hirao (Murakami, 1999: 11-4) meant that in a team with
foreign-born and Japanese players integrated together, a balance can be achieved that
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other teams find very difficult to match. He believed that the Japanese national team
should accept Japanese talents, while preserving the foreign (Western) fundamental
attitude and values. This is the exact opposite of most Japanese approaches to learning
from the West. Ever since the Meiji Era (1868-1912), 'wakonyosai' or 'Japanese spirit
and Western technology', has been the dominant mindset. The characteristics of
Japanese modernisation were symbolised by such phrases as 'wakonyosai'; which
means the Japanese active acceptance of Western technology while preserving the
fundamental Japanese mindset and attitudes, including the seishin spirit (see Section
2.2).
This idea of 'wakonyosai' has shaped the adoption of Western political, economic,
military and educational systems (Light, 1999:109), and its influence can still be clearly
seen today. However, Hirao's national team interestingly employed a reverse approach,
which is using Japanese talents under the strong influence of the 'Western spirit'. The
open use of the exact opposite approach to that used throughout modern Japanese
history shows the depth of foreign domination in Hirao's national team.
The team was touted as the strongest Japanese team ever, but at the 1999 World Cup in
Wales, it lost all its games. Despite having a total of six foreigners in the team to
'strengthen' it, the team failed to make an impression at the World Cup, and was
derisively named the 'Cherry Blacks' by the foreign and Japanese media (interview
with Mr. Murakami, 20 June 2002). Hirao, having built up expectations among
media and supporters, resigned to take responsibility for the team's failure.
5.62003 Brave Blossoms (Mukai Japan)
In 2003, national coach, Shogo Mukai led Japan into the World Cup tournament with a
different philosophy again. Mukai's motto was 'speed attack', and he certainly had
some speedy men in the backs, able to execute his design. He aimed to use foreign-born
players who would contribute to "Japanese rugby for the Japanese" (interview with
Shogo Mukai, 12 September 2003). Mukai formulated techniques and tactics were to
aim for a faster, more fluid running style deemed more suited to the Japanese physique.
The crucial criterion for selection was not outstanding individual skill, but rather their
ability to fit into Mukai's desired team style. Four foreign-born players were selected to
represent the Japanese national team for the 2003 RWC in October. Two New
Zealanders featured at centre, George Konia (NEC) and Reuben Parkinson (Sanix). The
other New Zealand-born players were at lock, Adam Parker (Toshiba) and Andrew
Miller (Kobe Steel) at halfback. Mukai explained the main reason for the selection of
foreign-born players in his national team:
Japan is one of the smallest teams in the World Cup competition. The team
needed to attack low and hard to counteract big foreign players. Our game
is based on turnovers and quick counter-attacking. The slogan 'speed attack'
fits the Japanese players more than any other national team. The strategy to
select foreign-born players in the team is to add much-needed steel to the
Japanese pack (as the relative lack of size among the forwards puts them at
a considerable disadvantage) and to provide spark for the team. To win
shows the world that Japanese rugby is on the way up. It is time to create a
new history for Japanese rugby. I hope that we can perform better than we
did at the last four World Cups (interview with Shogo Mukai, 12 September
2003).
Mukai also spoke about the problems with declining aspirations for the national team.
In his three years as coach of the national team since Hirao's resignation, Mukai
observed changes in the attitude of Japanese players towards the national team
compared to when he represented Japan:
At the 1987 World Cup, when I was in the national team, I was very
aware of the pride in the cherry jersey and the importance of the
national team. At the time, you could only play in the Japanese jersey
a mere three times a year. Players selected for the team now do not
show their happiness and thanks through their loyalty to and
identification with the team. On the contrary, they tend to be more
aware of the colours of their company team. I want the players to feel
the pride in wearing the Japanese jersey (interview with Shogo Mukai,
12 September 2003)
According to Mukai, Japanese players now grow up used to rivalry between company
teams in the company and All Japan Championship and define their rugby-playing
identity as such. Thus, even when called up for the Japanese national team, he found it
hard to stimulate a sense of shared national identity among them. As a result, his players
tended to have less pride in the Japanese jersey than they did in their own company's
'brand'. There has been a value shift away from aspirations of making the national team,
as the company clubs have control over players' (employment) contract, mobility and
availability for the national team. From the players' point of view, they there are at an
inferior position in the hierarchy of power relations (see Section 2.3), and must usually
bow to their company's wishes.
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As a first step to resolving this issue, in 2003 the JRFU suspended the entire domestic
company competition during the period of the World Cup, and introduced professional
contracts with players. However, even if there is no company competition during the
period when national team matches take place, the JRFU cannot yet require company
clubs to release players; the company clubs retain ultimate control over player
participation in national team matches. Moreover, the contracts were of a low value
relative to the average company player salary, being more of a 'minimum guarantee'
than a serious financial inducement. Also, the value of the contracts depended on the
number of caps a player had earned, so were less attractive to younger and foreign-born
players 108. Thus, there is still a clear tilt in the structure of Japanese rugby, in which the
company game takes precedence. And, as opined by Andrew Millar and Kevin Schuler
(see Section 2.5), as long as this situation continues, the competitive standing of the
Japanese national team is unlikely to improve significantly.
Despite these problems, Mukai worked hard to instil the pride, tradition and history of
the national team into his young players. Mukai implemented a three-year plan from
2000 to cultivate his distinctive style of rugby. Even though some foreign-born players
were selected for the team and technical advisors imported from Australia'l", Mukai
believed that, fundamentally, the Japanese national team should be recognisably
Japanese. However, despite this new direction, the Japanese national team continued to
108 Although foreign-born players and Japanese players were contracted on the same pay scale, crucially,
the pay varied based on the number of caps a player had earned before the 2003 RWC. Foreign-born
players, who in the main had played less caps for Japan, thus received less.
109 To move towards Mukai's ideal vision of rugby over the three years, the team needed higher levels of
fitness, higher quality of defence and a stronger front row. In 2000, the JRFU hired Gary Wallace (fitness
coach from Queensland Reds) on a three-year contract, and in 2003 appointed former Wallabies Mark
Ella (defence coach) and Mark Bell (serum coach) as technical advisors.
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perform badly on the international stage in 2002 and 2003110 . At the 2003 RWC Japan
was put in Pool D (with Scotland, France, Fiji and USA), where they were in winning
contention in every match, only to come up short each time, and unable to progress past
the group stage.
However, the team did succeed in showing 'Japaneseness' to the world (Yoshihiro
Sakata, 2003 111) . There were three key perceived attributes of the 'Japanese qualities' on
show. They were, firstly, a never-say-die spirit in the face of strong opposition (Scotland
and France), secondly, solid tackling, making 431 tackles from 554 attempts (77.8%) in
the four games, and thirdly, a sparklingly distinctive Japanese playing/attacking style.
This 'Japaneseness' fascinated the rugby world, and impressed media commentators
described the courageous Japanese team as the 'Brave Blossoms' (Freeman, 2003). My
father Yoshihiro Sakata also viewed the performance of the Japanese national team in
the World Cup positively, saying:
Japan cannot beat other strong national teams in a simple match of
strength. Even if foreign-born players are selected for the Japanese
national team, they should be chosen to fit Japanese tactics and
strategies. Winning or losing is but one aspect of the overall situation.
Either way, the team must show off Japanese rugby. Even despite loses,
if the team plays in a manner that surprises its opponent and allows it to
stand proud, it can make true Japanese rugby appeal to the world. At
least, I believed that Mukai Japan proved it at this World Cup (interview
with Yoshihiro Sakata, 18 October 2003)112.
110 Japan Test Results 2002-03: Beat Russia, Tokyo, 59-19; Lost to Tonga, Kumagaya, 29-41; Beat Korea,
Tokyo, 90-24; Beat Chinese Taipei, Tokyo, 155-3; Beat Korea, Seoul, 55-17; Beat Chinese Taipei, Tainan,
120-3; Lost Korea, UIsan, 34-45; Lost to Korea, Bangkok, 20-22; Lost to United States, San Francisco,
27-69; Lost to Russia, Tokyo, 34-43; Beat Korea, Osaka, 86-3; Lost to Australia A, Tokyo, 15-66 and Lost
to England A, Tokyo, 20-55.
ill I interviewed him at his living room after watching the RWC match between Japan and France on 18
October 2003.
112 This opinion has parallels in the Pacific Island, especially Samoan and Fijian rugby, has been regarded
by the world rugby media (Wyatt, 1996). That is, even in defeat, the teams can retain their popularity and
Since its establishment in 1987, the Rugby World Cup has come to be the defining
moment of a national team's performance, and the high point that teams spend four
years building for (Jones, 2003:7-9). It is at the World Cup that teams have the chance
to shine at the highest level, and to show off the special features of their nation's play.
(Thus Hirao Japan until 1999 and Mukai Japan until 2003). Thus, even in defeat, at the
World Cup a team can succeed in impressing the rugby world's media and spectators.
Player #4 can relate to the cycle of building up for the World Cup, as he has now
experienced it under two different coaches.
Player #4 played for the Japanese national team in 1999 and 2003. He has already made
himself into one of the local stars of Japanese rugby, and will likely grow to be a strong
leader in the national team. He explained to me (interview with player #4, 22 January
2004) how he has a mostly positive view of the roles and objectives of foreign-born
players in the national team. In particular, he appreciated the five New Zealand players
who, he said, brought admirable qualities to the national team:
I felt that the influence of the foreign players on Hirao's team four
years ago was amazing. Even though it is the Japanese national team
where pride and the will to win should be in clear view, it was the
foreign players leading us. They showed us what the Japanese
national team means to us. Under Mukai in 2003, rather than relying
on the foreign players, during the game they were working hard for
the rest of us as members of the team. We were made aware that there
is a great deal of interest in and respect for Japan. We have shown a
lot of commitment and dedication thanks to them (interview with
player #4,22 January 2004).
appeal to their national and global rugby public.
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Other Japanese players and coaches believed that those foreign-born players in Hirao's
team not only helped by supplying the lacking strength, skill and international
experience, but were also responsible for the strong leadership on the field. Player #4
attributes his newfound knowledge and experience of physical aggressiveness and
mental toughness in the game to those foreign-born players. The foreign-born players in
Mukai's team did not have as strong an influence on the style of playas in Hirao's team
in 1999, but their influence on the teams' better performances were unmistakable.
According to player #4, they encouraged their Japanese team-mates to perform at a
higher level, and the Japanese national team now had a solid core and promising team
Foreign-born player #2114 makes invaluable contributions to both his company club and
the Japanese national team. He had played for Canterbury Crusaders (Super 12) and Bay
of Plenty (NPC second-division) in 1997. He decided to move to take up his contract
with Kobe Steel club in Japan in 1998 as a 26 year-old, after he missed out on a Super
12 contract with the Waikato Chiefs. After six years in Japan, player #2 is considered an
embodiment of a player making an invaluable contribution to the quality of Japanese
company rugby115. He has a thorough knowledge of the strengths and shortcomings of
113 To encourage the growth of young players, Mukai selected 21-year-old prop Ryo Yamamura- while he
still lacked top-level experience, he had power and raw talent in abundance. His spark added to an
ever-stronger forward package, featuring the likes of Hajime Kiso, Naoya Okubo, Takeomi Ito, Yuya
Saito and Takuro Miuchi (captain) as the main force. The backline featured Toru Kurihara, Daisuke Ohata,
Hiroki Onozawa and Yukio Motoki, and the top-level experience they have accumulated is a major
encouragement for the national team.
114 I interviewed him at Kobe Bay Sheraton Hotel on 14 November 2003.
115 He came to believe that the Japanese players could actually play the game with their own distinctive
style, and helped to develop it. His efforts at Kobe Steel were bolstered by two other New Zealand
imports, ex-All Black Blair Larsen and Waikato NPC player Dean Anglesey. Kobe Steel's Kobe Steel's
premier team competed at the highest level, winning All company Championship titles in 1999 and 2000,
All Japan Championship titles in 1990 and 2000 and Top League Championship title in 2003. He showed
his guile, deception and a change of pace into the games. In those five seasons until the World Cup, he
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Japanese rugby, and fills a strategic role that fits into the Japanese playing style. He took
on board and put into practice the original tactics and strategies the team was trying to
use, reliably marshalling the team.
Having served a three-year qualifying period between 1998 and 2003, player #2 was
eligible to appear in the Japanese national team. From the perspective of the national
coach Mukai, the presence of player #2 was vital. The coach and all of the players trust
player #2 absolutely, seeing him as the on-field nerve-centre of Japanese rugby. As the
first-five eighth, they look to him to control a game and help to bring out the strengths
in the Japanese players in the backline outside him. The players are relieved to see him
in the game, helping the entire team to relax and focus on their own performance.
About being selected for the Japanese team, player #2 comments:
The World Cup was definitely a highlight. I am proud to wear the Japanese
national jersey. I have never played for a national side before. I am 31 years
old, and there will not be many more exciting moments in my playing career.
I have fitted into the Japanese national side well, and we all work together
as the Cherry Blossoms. Therefore, I have really enjoyed playing for the
Japan national team with Japanese boys from different company teams. I
tried my best to bring steadiness and confidence to games. We pulled
together really well since coming to Australia and have a really good team
atmosphere that has allowed us to become more confident and competitive
(interview with player #2, 14 November 2003).
scored an incredible 1067 points for Kobe Steel, including 40 tries and 294 conversions
(http://www.kobesteelrfc.com).
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The highly competitive performance of the Japanese national team
Cup showed the ability of Japanese rugby to surprise its opponents.
that for Japanese rugby to take the next step it needs more exposure to
levels, and to play more games against the best eight nations in the
France, Scotland and Wales More importantly, he argues that the Japanese natrona]
should keep its own original ideas and not copy New Zealand and Australian
play at the national level. He urges that the Japanese natural talents will go unl::le,re1<)l:)e:d
if Japan fails to cultivate its own distinctive style of rugby coaching. He
example of the success of Kobe Steel club with a good blend of elite Japanese n]"l\TP1""
and imported players. The team has had a clear vision and approached competition
a different playing style (flat-line attacking) under the influence of a Japanese coach,
compared with the failures of the national team.
5.7 Summary
This chapter has examined the case of foreign-born players in the Japanese national
rugby team. Since the 1980s, foreign-born players have had a large impact on both
company rugby and the national team, and this chapter has discussed both the history
and current issues surrounding their selection into the national team.
The chapter first considered the rules for eligibility to represent the Japanese national
team for foreign-born players. Whereas most major sports require participants in
international tournaments to hold citizenship of the country they represent, the IRB does
not impose such a regulation, instead delegating the detail of eligibility criteria to the
national unions. The JRFU requires only three years of residency in order to become
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eligible for the national team, and these criteria have caused controversy both within
Japan and within international rugby circles. Also, the JRFU is unable to require
company clubs to release players for national team representation, illustrating the tilt of
power relations in Japanese rugby towards the company clubs (also discussed in
Chapter Two).
Chapter Five also examined the history of foreign-born players in the national team. The
first case was in 1986, and as of July 2004, a total of 32 foreign-born players have
represented Japan. They have had a variety of influences and roles in the team, both
positive and negative. Positive influences have included making a clear contribution to
raising the standard of the game, both through their physical ability and mental
toughness. In particular, the foreign-born players selected until the mid-1990s were
mostly forwards, adding size and power. After that, more backs came to be selected, as
team management looked to add leadership and inspiration.
However, there have been negative aspects to the inclusion of foreign-born players.
There has been an element of 'New Zealand rugby hegemony', in that imported players
have come to dominate key positions such as number eight and centre, a trend often
called 'positional stacking'. This deprives home-grown talent of opportunities and is
therefore detrimental to the overall development of the national team. This is the
dilemma caused by the need to be strong to win in the present set against the need to
build local players for the future. Also, team management, especially under Seiji Hirao
until 1999, aimed to make powerful and skilful foreign-born players the centrepiece of
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the team, raising the question of whether or not the team was in fact a truly Japanese
team any more.
The key analysis of this chapter has come through three comparative studies of the
national team at different points in time; 'Ohnishi Japan' in 1968, the so-called 'classic
era' of the Japanese mono-cultural rugby style, 'Hirao Japan' in 1999, perhaps at the
peak of foreign involvement and reliance, and 'Mukai Japan' in 2003, where team
management was looking to rebuild a Japanese style of play with foreign-born players
included only if they fitted team management's philosophy. Through these case studies,
a number of themes have emerged, but two topics of particular significance are of the
playing style employed, and the changing in attitudes and aspiration towards the
national team.
There is a clear difference in playing style between Ohnishi Japan of 1968 and the
latter-day teams. Ohnishi's Japanese-developed style emphasised 'expansion, approach
and connection', with speed and ball movement as the keys. However, as the number of
international matches and information flows increased during the 1980s, Japanese
coaches came to instead emphasise contact play, with size and power the keys. This
approach is naturally suited to generally larger foreign-born players.
In the 1960s, the low number of international matches meant that being selected for the
All-Japan team was a rare honour. Wearing the cherry jersey was a privilege that players
were proud to have received, and it inspired loyalty. However, with the rapid
development of company rugby since the mid-1980s, a number of heated domestic
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rivalries have emerged, and many players now feel a greater affiliation to their cornp,lfiv
team. Additionally, company clubs control player availability, and many are reluctant to
release their players for fear of injury. This weakness of the JRFU in the power relations
with the company teams continues to cause problems for the development of the
Japanese national team.
In these circumstances, foreign-born players have played an interesting role in reviving
Japanese pride in their national team. Players like Andrew McCormick, who captained
the team, and player #2, who played a pivotal position, not only brought their own
talents to the team, but also tried to set an example to instil pride and loyalty to the
jersey, while inspiring their Japanese team-mates to higher performance. This has been a
slightly ironic, and in a sense unexpected, benefit of the presence of foreign-born
players in the national team.
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Chapter Six: CONCLUSION
The transformation of rugby from an amateur to a professional sport since 1996 and the
influence of foreign players have led to significant changes in the structure of Japanese
rugby over the past few decades. This thesis has a dual focus on both the development
of Japanese rugby and the influence of foreign players on it over time. I have employed
analytical and empirical work in the area of sports sociology that is specific to the
structures and objectives of Japanese rugby. This therefore has given a clearer
understanding of the cultural influences, organisational structures/competitions and
labour relations in the Japanese game, and its relationship with migrant players in the
company leagues and the national team.
I provided a brief historical overview of the development of rugby in Japan. Japanese
rugby created particular forms of identity such as styles of organisation, competitions,
playing styles, team philosophy and behaviours through their interpretation in a specific
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cultural context. Rugby in Japan developed within institutions of education, notably
elite universities. As a physical game that allows players to use their whole bodies,
rugby is an ideal medium to promote the development within players of a sense of
collective responsibility, self-discipline and endurance. Furthermore, as Japanese rugby
developed in relative isolation, local cultural practice blended with the introduced
'form' of the game to produce original Japanese playing styles.
Focussing on the organisational structure and relations of Japanese rugby, I explained
how the JRFU institutionalised domestic competitions (at high school, university and
company level) as an amateur game, with the ultimate aim of creating a strong national
team. The National Inter-High School Tournament has maintained ideals of amateurism
since its establishment in 1918. The three traditional universities (Keio, Waseda and
Meiji) and their alumni developed a strong rivalry and attracted popular support,
strengthening their cultural identity. The JRFU has built on their popularity by
promoting the All-University Championship, attracting more universities, which
recruited more high school players, and sometimes foreign players.
In-depth scrutiny of company rugby enabled me to explain how the shift from
amateurism to professionalism in 1996 has caused major upheavals. I outlined the
changes in labour relations (from lifetime employment through the shakaijin amateur
model to professional contracts) towards a more professional-style competition. JJULHIB
my father's rugby career in the 1960s and 70s, the game was strictly amateur,
full-time work commitment required. In the late 1980s, the emphasis shifted to a unique
shakaijin amateur model, allowing players to mix work and play. As companies
increase their public profile through rugby, they attracted foreign players and elite
university players; even in rugby's 'amateur' era, some players were paid as
semi-professionals. After 1996, who is amateur or professional is largely a matter of
personal interpretation. In the new Top League, some teams could well be considered
'professional' .
The JRFU presented a structural reform, establishing the Top League competition in
2003 to promote a higher level of rugby, and to build a stronger national team. However,
there are inconsistencies in the Top League structure, as the JRFU treats it as an amateur
company competition, while the company teams playing in it understand the new league
to be a major step towards professional rugby, It could be said that the establishment of
the Top League spelt an end to the control by the JRFU over the top 12 company
teams 116. In the power relations of Japanese rugby, the elite company clubs now
dominate, having control over players' contracts, status and availability for the national
team. As seen in the case study of Yamaha RFC, the introduction of the Top League has
also led to a change towards professional-style club management and labour relations
between players and the club officials. However, because company clubs are dependant
on their parent companies for funding, and because of the growing financial and
competitive differences between company clubs, some companies have become unable
to support their teams at a competitive level, and drop out. More than 200 company
clubs such as Kevin Schuler's Nisshin Steel were suspended or closed between 1997
and 2001.
116 The same situation is apparent in the UK, with the top club teams seemingly always in conflict with
the English RFU about players, competitions and the national team demands. Sir Clive Woodward,
ex-coach of the England national team, recently resigned his position, saying that 'I am could not get the
RFU and the clubs to co-operate' (http://www.sanspo.com/rugby/top/rg200409/rg2004090402.html).
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In Chapter Three, I examined the company game, the arrival of foreign players and the
influence those players exerted on the sport. The influx of foreign players has been
demonstrated to be closely linked to the major shift in playing standards in the company
clubs and competitions over the last 20 years. The migration of foreign players to Japan
is primarily dependent on the demand of Japanese company teams, as they form the
most economically powerful leagues in Japanese rugby. Company clubs have tended to
draw on foreign sources (mainly New Zealand players) to strengthen their company
teams, such as technical skills, coaching methods and playing styles. In 1991, the JRFU
restricted the number of foreign players allowed on each team to only two on the field.
However, this official condoning of foreign participation (as first effective
acknowledgement of influence of foreign players) saw more and more companies begin
to employ foreign players under the then-amateur regulations to raise the profile and
standards of their company club.
The registration system has (until 2004) encouraged company teams to employ
Southern Hemisphere players, in particular New Zealand players. However, not all
players have played similar roles in their teams. Some have been gaijin suketto (foreign
helpers), employed to fill a narrow role, such as adding power to the forward pack.
More recently, others have been more like oyatoi gaikokujin (employed foreigners),
who have been highly respected as teachers and leaders for their team-mates. Many
have successfully contributed to their teams, and some, such as Kevin Schuler, have
stayed for many years. However, there have been some notable failures, mainly through
the inability to adjust to and functionally integrate into the Japanese rugby environment.
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There is a cultural gap on and off the field that some players have been unable to bridge.
In particular, the case of Rua Tipoki shows the importance of self-discipline, because in
Japanese rugby, individual misdemeanours cause loss of face for the entire organisation.
Like many company clubs, the case of Yamaha RFC, considered in Chapter Four, is a
relevant example of how foreign players are accepted on their merits and what they can
bring to the team. Here, as elsewhere, foreign players promote higher standards of play,
help local players learn skills and fitness techniques, and set a professional example for
them. I looked at the Yamaha club from three main angles; its history, labour relations
(between the club and players), and the degree of inequality between players. Yamaha is
a relatively new team, which has tried to establish its own identity and culture. It has
become much more focused on rugby, with players and administrators devoting most of
their working day to improving the team's performance, and in doing so, also breaking
away from the traditional Japanese hierarchical style of rugby organisation.
Yamaha has aimed to build a new strategic relationship with foreign players, reducing
the division between them and Japanese players, in order to strengthen a culture of all
players working together for each other. This is a major break from the traditional
age-based hierarchical model of Japanese interpersonal relations. However, there is still
a high degree of inequality between players, based on career status. Some foreign
players, especially New Zealanders, are on very high salaries, and play leading roles as
teachers and motivators, as well as star players. However, others, notably Fijian players,
receive lower pay, and are employed as suketto to fill narrower roles. Among Japanese
players too, there are divisions, primarily between those few on professional contracts
(who still receive less than foreign professional players despite having given up their
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long-term job security), and the majority, who are aiming to be company employees for
life. In this way, the discrepancies in salary, status and hence expectations from team
management have not been erased, and the team is far from its goal of being 'the best
rugby organisation in the world'.
In Chapter Five, I analysed the presence of foreign-born players in the Japanese national
team. I considered the history, roles and various contributions of foreign-born players. I
began with their eligibility, but the chapter's main analytical method is through
historical comparative case studies of the Japanese national team at three different
stages, 1968, 1999 and 2003. Unlike many other professional sports and rugby-playing
nations, which require citizenship, since 1992 foreign-born rugby players have been
eligible to represent Japan after three years playing for a Japanese company team. This
is a controversial regulation; while foreign-born players have clearly contributed to a
raise in the team's mental and physical strength, they have arguably denied Japanese
players opportunities to represent their country through 'stacking' of key positions.
Other parts of the Asian rugby community also disapprove of Japan's eligibility criteria.
The first foreign-born player represented Japan in 1986, and as of July 2004, a total of
32 foreign-born players have worn the cherry jersey. As more and more foreign players
began to be employed by company teams, the management of the national team, looking
to add size and power to compete in international tournaments such as the Rugby World
Cup, was keen to select foreign-born players. However, this may have come at the cost
of the loss of original Japanese coaching methods and playing styles.
This became clear during my case study analysis, of Ohnishi Japan in 1968, Riraa
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Japan in 1999 and Mukai Japan in 2003. I looked at the different selection criteria,
coaches' rugby philosophies and team building methods, and regarding aesthetic and
tactical changes, could periodise these cases into 'original', 'the peak of foreign
involvement and reliance' and 'revival of original'. The coaches have gone from
emphasising speed and ball movement (Ohnishi), to stressing size and power (Hirao), to
'speed attack' (Mukai). These marked changes have paralleled the changes in foreign
influence.
Moreover, Japanese players' sense of affiliation to the national team has also changed
significantly. In the 1960s, the rarity value of national team matches meant that they
were an honour and a privilege; by the late 1990s, the faster pace of development of the
company game meant that many Japanese players, particularly given the company
clubs' control over player status and labour relations, feel more loyalty to their company
club than to the national team. Interestingly, it is foreign players in the national team
who have helped to revive the sense of pride and loyalty to the cherry jersey.
In summary, there have been many changes in Japanese rugby over the last 30 years.
The growing popularity of company rugby and the coming of professionalism in 1996
are notable changes, but it is perhaps the influx of foreign influences that has stood out.
The presence of foreign-born players in company teams and the national team has gone
from a novelty to the norm, and the effects on Japanese players and coaches have been
many and varied. However, their contribution to the raising of standards in Japanese
rugby cannot be denied.
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The three factors above and other subsidiary trends have produced a complex interplay
of forces, the results of which are not yet clear. Japanese rugby is at a crucial stage ofits
development. However, uncertainty also means opportunity, and while Japanese rugby
faces many pressing issues, we can look to the future with optimism.
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Table 1: The Team Profile in the Top League (the 2003-4 season)
NEC Kintetsu Kubota Kobelco Suntory Sanyo
Nickname Green Liners Spears Steelers Sungoliath Wild Knights
Rockets
Company Electric Railways Industry Co. Steel Beverage Electric
Establishment 1985 1929 1978 1928 1980 1960
Home Chiba Osaka Tokyo Kobe Tokyo Gunma
Team Secom Toshiba Sanix Yamaha Ricoh World
Nickname Rugguts Brave Lupus Bombs Jubilo BlackRams Fighting Bulls
Company Security Electric Home sanitation Motors Printer, Fax Apparel
&Scanner
Establishment 1985 1948 1994 1984 1953 1984
Home Tokyo Tokyo Fukuoka Shizuoka Tokyo Kobe
The Structure of Top League Competition
TIlt' structur« '!I'Japall Rllgby Tap Leagu»
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Table 1. Distribution /Total Number of Foreign Rugby Players in Japanese Company teams (1978-2002)
NZ AUS FIJI TONGA SAMOA KOR CAN OTHER Total
1978/1979 2 2
1987/1988 2 2 4
1988/1989 3 2 2 7
1989/1990 1 1 2 2 3 9
1990/1991 9 3 4 7 23
1991/1992 10 3 5 2 20
1992/1993 12 1 1 2 1 6 2 4 29
1993/1994 17 2 2 2 1 3 2 6 35
1994/1995 20 5 7 4 3 2 7 48
1995/1996 23 5 7 4 3 2 7 51
1996/1997 30 12 11 9 3 10 75
1997/1998 36 13 15 14 1 2 8 89
1998/1999 30 12 11 9 3 10 75
1999/2000 49 11 9 17 3 3 4 96
2000/2001 50 18 6 14 4 7 99
2001/2002 50 15 6 12 10 4 97
2002/2003 46 11 13 16 7 3 96
(Rugby Almanac of Japan by JAPAN RUGBY MAGAZINE 1987-2002)
138
Table 2: The list of foreign-born players in the Japanese national team
Previous
International
Number Year Name Position Nationality Club appearance
1 1985 Nohomuli Taumoefolau LO Tonga Sanyo
2 1986 Hopoi Taione CTB Tonga Sanyo
3 1987 Sinali Latu FL Tonga Daito Bunka Uni
4 1990 Ekeroma Luaiufi FL NZ Niko Niko Do
5 1992 Lopeti Oto WTB Tonga Daito Bunka Uni
6 1993 Samuel Kaleta LO Samoa Ricoh
7 1993 SioneLatu N08 Tonga Daito Bunka Uni
8 1993 Bruce Fergason LO Fiji Hino Motors Fiji
9 1993 Ian Williams WTB AUS Kobe Steel AUS
10 1993 Tupo Faamasino FB Samoa Niko Niko Do Samoa
11 1996 David Bickle LO England Kobe Steel
12 1996 Andrew McCormick CTB NZ Toshiba
13 1997 Isikeli Basiyalo LO Fiji Toyota
14 1997 Robert Gordon N08 NZ Toshiba NZ
15 1997 Patiliai Tuidraki WTB Fiji Toyota Fiji
16 1998 Greg Smith FL NZ Toyota Shokki
17 1998 Ross Thompson N08 NZ NEC
18 1998 Stephen Miln CTB NZ Kaneka
19 1999 Jamie Joseph N08 NZ Sanix NZ
20 1999 Graeme Bachop SH NZ Sanix NZ
21 2000 Carl Todd LO NZ IBM
22 2001 Luatang Vativei N08 Tonga Daito Bunka Uni
23 2001 Andrew Miller SO NZ Kobe Steel
24 2001 Brendan Neilson FB NZ NEC
25 2002 Richard Coventry LO NZ Toyota
26 2002 Dean Anglesey FL NZ Kobe Steel
27 2002 Errol Brain N08 NZ Toyota NZMaori
28 2002 Adam Parker LO NZ Toshiba
29 2003 George Konia CTB NZ NEC
30 2003 Reuben Parkinson CTB NZ Sanix
*Note: As of the Test match against Italy on 4 July 2004, 32 foreign-born players have played for the Japanese national team.
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Founded
Capital
Headquarters
Company Profile: YAMAHA MOTOR
July 1, 1955
43,439 million yen (as of March 31, 2004)
Iwata-city, Shizuoka Prefecture
Employee Consolidation
Sales Consolidation
Sales Distribution
Business
33,694 (as of March 31, 2004)
Parent: 8,078 (as of March 31, 2004)
Sales Consolidated:
1,020,266 million yen (from April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004)
Parent:
585,044 million yen (from April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004)
Sales byproduct (%) (ConsolidatJolI)
Sales by regloll(%) (ConsoLidation)
Asia
Manufacture and sales of motorcycles, scooters, electro-hybrid
bicycles, boats, sail boats, Water Vehicles, pools, utility boats,
fishing boats, outboard motors, diesel engines, 4-wheel ATVs,
racing karts, golf cars, multi-purpose engines, generators, water
pumps, snowmobiles, small-sized snow throwers, automotive
engines, intelligent machinery, industrial-use remote control
helicopters, electrical power units for wheelchairs, helmets.
Import and sales of various types of products, development of
tourist businesses and management of leisure, recreational
facilities and related services.
140
PRIMARY SOURCES
Regulations relating to foreign players
JRFU:
Amateur Guide Book 1991
Regulations Handbook 2003
Regulations IRB 2003
Regulations Top League 2003
JAPAN RUGBYMAGAZINE:
The Rugby Almanac of Japan (Year Book) 1978-2003
Completed Guide HANAZONO 2003:(the 83rd Inter-High School Rugby Tournament)
JRFU:
The Test Match Statistics for the Japanese National Team: 1930-2003
The JRFU Annual Report 2003-4
The JRFU Annual Financial Statement 2003-4
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MEDIA SOURCES
Newspapers:
Asahi Newspaper (JPN)
Yomiuri Newspaper (JPN)
Rugby Magazines:
INSIDE Rugby (AUS)
RUGBY MAGAZINE (JPN)
RUGBY WORLD (JPN)
NZRUGBY (NZ)
SPORTS DIGEST (NZ)
Sports Graphic: Number (JPN)
RUGBY WORLD CUP PREVIEW (JAN)
World Cup Rugby Preview Rugby News (JPN)
Electronic:
www.chugoku-np.co.jp
www.irb.com/laws-regs/regs/index.cfm
www.japantime.com
www.npb.or.jp
www.nzherald.co.nz
www.j-league.or.jp
www.jrfu-member/open/press/index.html
www.jubilo-iwata.co.jp
www.so-net.ne.jp/feg/k-l/top.htm
www.rugby-japan.jp
www.rugbyworldcup.com
www.sanspo.com/rugby
www.sumo.or.jp
www.theage.co.au/articles
www.top-league.jp
www.yamaha-motor.co.jp/sports/rugby
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TV:
Fijian players in the Yamaha RFC, Rugby Planet, 18 December 2003.
Special feature on Rugby World Cup, IRB The World of Rugby Weekly:, Sky TV, June 2003
The Challenge to drive the rebirth of Japanese rugby, Sports Continent (Documentary), NHK, 8
August 2003.
The Top League Profile: Yamaha Motors, JSports, October 2004.
Radio:
PM NHK Shinya-bin (Midnight Express] : 'Ano koro, Ano play -Sakata Yoshihiro hen-' [Those days,
Those games -the story ofSakata Yoshihiro-] ,December 16, 1999, 11:45 pm.
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